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Abstract 
Directed energy weapons (DEW) are of interest to the armed forces as they search 
for more effective ways to deal with evolving threats. The development of these weapons 
has been ongoing for almost 40 years, despite only one operational fielding by the U.S. 
Navy in 2014. Some reasons for DEW’s lack of adoption by the services include cost 
overruns and unclear requirements. Early adoption of human systems integration (HSI) in 
the military’s acquisition process is shown to provide substantial cost savings over the 
life of the system. Quantifying the application of HSI within a DEW acquisition program 
is addressed through decision analysis using value-focused thinking (VFT). The VFT 
model helps program managers and HSI practitioners balance total system performance 
and cost of ownership. Knowledge gathered from expert elicitation was used to create the 
decision model consisting of objectives in a hierarchal format. The proposed VFT model 
is a beginning step that allows for an objective analysis of HSI efforts in a DEW 
acquisition program. Further work is required to make the model practical for use.  
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MEASURING HUMAN SYSTEMS INTEGRATION IN 
DIRECTED ENERGY WEAPON ACQUISITION PROGRAMS 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Science fiction has long had a love affair with the laser. The Martians in H.G. 
Wells’ 1898 book The War of the Worlds used invisible heat ray weapons. The 1964 
James Bond film Goldfinger portrayed the use of a laser beam that could cut through 
solid gold. Perhaps the most well-known use of a laser in science fiction is the Death Star 
from Star Wars, which can destroy entire planets. These classic examples depict lasers 
exclusively as weapons and spawned real-life application of such devices. Wells’ heat ray 
weapons are seen today as infrared lasers. The James Bond laser foreshadowed extensive 
industrial laser use in the 1970s. Unsurprisingly, laser technology has not yet reached the 
level depicted in Star Wars. 
Lasers are the most easily recognized type of directed energy (DE) and have so 
far taken the majority of the monetary investment into these programs (Welch & 
Hermann, 2007). However, the energy also comes in several other forms such as high-
powered microwaves (HPM), particle-beams, and sonic or ultrasonic waves (Antal, 
2013). All forms of DE hold potential for weaponization due to some advantages over 
conventional weapons. Directed energy weapons (DEW) are more precise, have a lower 
cost per shot, and can be scaled. A criticism of some currently used kinetic weapons is 
their high cost relative to the target they are neutralizing. DEWs promise to reverse the 
cost so the threat being neutralized is more expensive than the weapon being used to 
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target it. However, DEWs are at a disadvantage in that they are line-of-sight weapons 
with no indirect fire capability. DEWs also suffer from beam attenuation, which is the 
reduction in intensity of the beam as it passes through matter (McKetty, 1998). Matter in 
the atmosphere such as dust, smoke, and water vapor can cause the beam to attenuate, by 
no means a small problem in adverse weather conditions where conventional kinetic 
weapons may function better. 
The weaponization of lasers are of interest to all branches of the military as they 
look towards the future in search of more effective ways to deal with evolving threats. 
Lasers are generally agreed to hold the most promise for a wide range of applications 
such as destroying incoming projectiles or disabling vehicles. The laser as a weapon is 
still developing as work is done to increase power and range while using less energy and 
occupying a smaller footprint. As research and development continues, the first fielding 
of such weapons has already taken place by the U.S. Navy in 2014 (Feickert, 2018) and 
the next step for the military is determining which platforms to use laser-based weapons 
on and for what application. Considerations for these next generation weapons include 
initial and operating costs, personnel and training requirements, safety concerns, and 
possible ethical dilemmas. 
 The U.S. does not own a monopoly on DEWs. Adversaries, potential adversaries, 
and allies have varying degrees of their own DEW programs. Although not proven, there 
were claims of sonic and ultrasonic attacks on U.S. diplomats in both Cuba and China in 
recent years (Fu, Xu, & Yan, 2018). Sonic, or audible, devices are already used 
throughout the world by police and military forces as crowd control devices. Recognizing 
that some of the DE technology is already viable and fielded, a real concern of military 
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officials is being outpaced by other countries’ DEW technology and procurement. The 
John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 reflects these 
sentiments with $915 million authorized for DE research, development, test, and 
evaluation; additionally, $22 million was authorized for the construction of a directed 
energy systems integration lab (115th Congress, 2018). This proves a willingness of the 
government to trust in the Department of Defense’s (DoD) assessment that monetary 
resources should be applied to the DE field to further the military’s capabilities. 
 Getting DEWs in the military’s arsenal is a process. The military acquisition 
process is broken into five phases: material solution analysis, technology development, 
engineering and manufacturing development, production and deployment, and operations 
and support (Carr & Greene, 2009b). Preceding those five phases is the first stage, 
development. In the most general sense, this is where an operational requirement is 
identified, potential alternatives are analyzed, Congress authorizes and appropriates 
funds, proposals are gathered, and contractors are selected to begin work on the program 
(Fox, Allen, Lassman, Moody, & Shiman, 2011). The entire process is long, arduous, and 
subject to much bureaucracy. 
Cost overruns are an almost inevitable part of military acquisition programs. 
Many major defense programs take at least 15 years to come to fruition while also 
coming in over double the budget and being delivered with less capability than originally 
defined (Fox et al., 2011). Without completely revamping the military acquisition 
process, there are multiple ways in which the risk of outrunning the budget can be 
mitigated. One method is to take a multitude of factors into account at the beginning of 
the program using proven techniques such as decision analysis. Some factors indicating 
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decision analysis may be a good choice for DEW acquisition are complexity, conflicting 
consequences, and uncertainty. The DEW, acquisition process, and HSI are all complex 
entities by themselves. The ability to quantify values in decision analysis reduces the 
complexity to a point where it can be understood and analyzed. Decision analysis is good 
for problems with conflicting consequences because of its use of objective trade-offs. 
That is, risk may be reduced in one area while simultaneously increasing another area 
(Goel, 1992). Finally, the uncertainty of outcomes lends itself to decision analysis 
through its use of value functions for decisions made under certainty and utility functions 
for decisions made under uncertainty. 
Part of systems engineering (SE) includes the relationship between the human and 
the system. This management process is known as human systems integration (HSI). 
NASA’s depiction of 32 programs in Figure 1 show that those investing less than 5% on 
SE are almost guaranteed an 80% or greater overrun. Applying decision analysis 
techniques on HSI within DEW programs could give the project a better chance of 
meeting its time and budget goals. 
 
Figure 1. Total Program Overrun (adapted) (Gruhl, 1992) 
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 The information shown in Figure 1 demonstrates that “defining the project” is 
often underfunded and overlooked, thereby costing significant amounts of extra money. 
This coincides with Figure 2, which shows the estimated HSI investment range. This 
research does not investigate the actual monetary values but instead focuses on the 
evaluation of HSI based on HSI's importance as demonstrated in Figure 1 and Figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 2. HSI Investment Estimate (adapted) from Impact of SE at NASA 
(as cited in Booth, 2009) 
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 6 
advanced fighter aircraft, sensors, and weapons. However, these traditional technological 
threats are quickly spreading to other countries and the Air Force sees increasing threats 
in ever expanding locations and scenarios. The second threat comprises capabilities that 
negate the Air Force’s current advantages in the space domain; it includes increased 
number and complexity of cyberspace threats, and increased sophistication of air threats 
like hypersonic missiles and conventional ballistic missile systems. The Air Force does 
not see itself as capable of fighting and winning against these emerging threats with its 
projected force structure and current acquisition process (Department of the Air Force, 
2016). 
The results of the Air Superiority 2030 Flight Plan invariably lead to the need for 
new or improved technology and systems. The study (Department of the Air Force, 2016) 
recognizes the development of next generation weapon systems often becomes mired in 
cycles of ever increasing costs in part due to technology that has not caught up to the 
idea. The culprit exists in many forms whether it be an overly aggressive timeline, not 
devoting enough resources to the project, or not focusing on the right problem. Formal 
acquisition programs generally do not mesh well with cutting edge technology and 
inevitably underperform. Because of these problems, the Air Force chartered Enterprise 
Capability Collaboration Team (2016) recommends shifting the focus from “next 
generation” platforms to a collaborative effort between science and technology, 
acquisition, requirements, and industry professionals. The new approach requires 
adaptable and affordable processes. 
A way to address the real problem is to use practiced and proven methods early in 
the acquisition process. One such method is value-focused thinking (VFT), an approach 
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developed by Keeney (1992) that looks at values as the means to create alternatives and 
make decisions. VFT is later described as an interactive approach to decision analysis 
(Parnell, Bresnick, Tani, & Johnson, 2013). Using VFT allows a decision-maker to focus 
on what really matters. As such, VFT is an excellent candidate to assess the maturity and 
readiness of potential “game-changing” technologies such as DE. Decision analysis using 
VFT does a good job of dealing with subjectivity from the entire process. 
Any new acquisition program’s total ownership cost can be reduced with the 
integration of HSI (Honour, Axelband, & Rhodes, 2004; Liu, 2010; Onkham, 
Karwowski, & Ahram, 2012). As noted in Figure 1, increased investment in the defining 
phases normally results in reduced program overruns. Although the total savings vary 
between programs, early investment and realization of SE and HSI generally keeps cost 
overruns in the negligible to 75% range (Gruhl, 1992), significantly less than the 80-
180% range of programs with minimal SE and HSI investment. The DoD acknowledged 
the fact when they mandated the incorporation of HSI early in the acquisition cycle (Liu, 
Valerdi, Rhodes, Kimm, & Headen, 2010). 
Different agencies and military departments define HSI differently. However, 
they generally agree that HSI is, in a most general sense, the optimization of total system 
performance with the human operator. The Air Force divides HSI into nine domains: 
manpower, personnel, training, environment, safety, occupational health, habitability, 
survivability, and human factors engineering (Carr & Greene, 2009a). The human factors 
domain tends to make the most headlines due to its direct relation between the human 
operator and the system. 
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1.2 Problem Statement 
An overarching goal of defense acquisition could be characterized as, “make 
America stronger, now and in the future” by administering efficient, quality, state of the 
art acquisition programs (Ward, 2011). The successful incorporation of HSI into the 
acquisition effort at the earliest possible point can substantially reduce life cycle costs. 
While the current methods for applying HSI to acquisition programs are detailed in 
numerous Air Force manuals and handbooks, it is unknown if there is a better way to 
measure HSI within a particular program. Simply applying HSI wherever it can be fit in 
does not determine if the correct HSI domains are being addressed and to what extent 
trade-offs should be made. 
DEWs are billed as a cost-effective solution to using increasingly expensive 
kinetic weapons to combat adversaries’ progressively sophisticated weapons. DEW 
development is not unlike other Defense acquisition programs in that there are immense 
pressures to balance total system performance and cost of ownership.  Knowing which 
HSI elements to incorporate into a program and give priority to can assist decision-
makers early in the acquisition process.  Assessing how well a DEW acquisition program 
has incorporated the HSI elements can help the program stay on track and within budget. 
The inability to determine if HSI efforts are focused correctly is a problem that needs to 
be addressed. 
Knowledge is sometimes defined as individual and institutional. Individuals’ 
knowledge comes and goes with the individual while institutional knowledge is retained 
within the organization. A concern of many organizations is losing the knowledge 
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possessed by individuals as they depart because of the inability to transfer that knowledge 
into institutional knowledge. 
1.3 Objectives and Approach 
1.3.1 Objectives 
The overall objective of this research is to answer how decision analysis using 
VFT can be used to assess the application of HSI within a DEW acquisition program. 
Four investigative questions are used: 
• How can an expert’s knowledge of the manpower, personnel, training, human 
factors, and safety HSI domains be represented in a value hierarchy? 
• How can knowledge, both tacit and explicit, be captured from an HSI expert and 
transferred to someone else? 
• How can captured knowledge improve a DEW acquisition program? 
• How can the importance of each HSI domain be identified? 
1.3.2 Approach 
Even though each DEW acquisition program is different in terms of size, scope, 
and purpose, they all involve some elements of HSI. This analysis will focus on 
identifying which elements are important so the right amount of time and effort can be 
put towards those specific elements. The use of decision analysis in this research is 
largely predicated on its successful application in various other fields. Decision analysis 
has been used successfully by Ford when deciding whether to produce its own tires, by 
Pillsbury on whether to use boxes or bags for certain products, and by Honeywell to 
evaluate the attractiveness of weapons programs (Ulvila & Brown, 1982). As noted by 
Morais et al. (2013), decision analysis using the VFT philosophy has been used by the 
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Air Force to select innovative force protection ideas (Jurk, Chambal, & Thal, 2004), the 
Croatian Armed forces to select an automatic rifle (Peharda & T, 2008), a publishing 
company to examine the strategic implications of mobile technology (Sheng, Nah, & 
Siau, 2005), and a tourist management company to assess the vitality of rural areas 
(Kajanus, Kangasb, & Kurttilac, 2004). 
1.4 Assumptions 
Decision analysis problems involve some level of uncertainty. The uncertainty 
can arise from incomplete facts or knowledge about future events that affect choices 
made in the present. Decisions made under certainty, that is, when decision-makers know 
the outcome of selecting an alternative, use value functions for calculations. Decisions 
made under uncertainty, or when the outcome of selecting an alternative are unknown, 
use utility functions. This research uses value functions because alternative selection in 
the acquisition process means that alternative will proceed while alternatives not selected 
will not move forward. Furthermore, lack of data for this research made the use of value 
functions obligatory. 
The assessment of HSI using VFT has not been previously applied directly to a 
DEW program. Uncertainty regarding changes to the DEW program will not be 
considered because the hierarchy can be modified to account for changes when they 
happen. Furthermore, utilizing VFT and its hierarchy in the first place should help keep 
the program on track by initially determining the importance of HSI. 
This research is predicated on the assumption that the sponsor is an expert. The 
sponsor was used for virtually all pertinent steps in building the model. If he turned out 
not to be an expert, the model would be virtually useless as a defendable method for 
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measuring HSI. It should be noted that a different expert could, and probably would, 
come up with a different set of values for the model. However, the sponsor/expert used in 
this research is by all accounts an expert in the related fields and qualified to assist.  
For this research to have a meaningful impact, the assumption was made that the 
military acquisition process will not depart radically from its current format in the next 10 
to 20 years. The process has remained relatively stable over the years and there are no 
indications that this will change. The need for this assumption is directly related to the 
small scope this research covers, namely HSI in DEW acquisition programs. There are 
not many, if any, non-military uses for the specifics of the model being presented. 
1.5 Preview 
Chapter II covers the history of DEWs including what has been tried, what has 
failed, currently used DEWs, and what the military expects to use in the near future. The 
military acquisition process will be discussed, focusing on the general flow and how 
programs are evaluated from start to finish. Examples of the importance of HSI will also 
be discussed with an emphasis on military application. Decision analysis using VFT 
examples, advantages, and disadvantages will be covered. Finally, experts and knowledge 
will be discussed. Chapter III provides the “how-to” of the VFT model and shows why 
VFT can be utilized for this particular problem. It also covers knowledge elicitation 
techniques and choosing the right expert. Chapter IV covers the model’s hierarchy and 
how it would be applied. In conclusion, Chapter V discusses areas of future research and 
insights gained from this research. 
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II. Literature Review 
 
 This chapter reviews current and projected directed energy weapon (DEW) 
applications as well as the acquisition process and how acquisition programs are 
evaluated. It also covers human systems integration (HIS), positive and negative 
outcomes of HSI, decision analysis using value-focused thinking (VFT), and examples of 
VFT implementation. The end result should be an understanding of the complex and 
difficult process to field a DEW with the appropriate HSI principles and how VFT could 
be used to do so. 
2.1 Directed Energy Weapons 
 For years, DEWs resided in the realm of science fiction. The end of the 19th 
century saw a type of DEW, the heat ray, introduced to the public through the novel War 
of the Worlds. Although the heat ray was a fictional weapon in a science fiction book, the 
general concept is pretty close to the reality of infrared lasers. It is not quite the DEW that 
people imagine, being invisible as opposed to a visible laser.  
 As noted by the Department of State (1983), the military began researching 
DEWs in earnest during the 1980s, after President Ronald Reagan proposed the Strategic 
Defense Initiative program (SDI). The announcement focused on a plan to defend the 
country from nuclear attack by way of a space-based missile defense program. Futuristic 
technology was proposed, including space-based lasers that had not yet been developed. 
The President’s announcement raised questions as noted by Levi (1983) that are still 
relevant today. 
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• What missions might such weapons systems fulfill? 
• What hurdles currently block the way to practical realization of these systems? 
• What arguments are being made for and against DEW systems? 
2.1.1 Missions 
 What missions might such weapons systems fulfill? DEWs are generally 
envisioned as defensive weapons. From the military’s initial vision of DEWs providing 
protection from nuclear attack to a more recent but similar vision of countering incoming 
rockets, artillery, and mortars (C-RAM), the defensive capabilities have always seemed 
more viable than offensive ray-gun type efforts. The Air Force outlined three distinct 
areas of interest: forward base defense, aircraft self-protection, and precision strike 
(Stanley, 2018). It should be noted that the defensive capabilities of DEWs could feasibly 
be used in an offensive role, if desired. 
2.1.2 Hurdles 
What hurdles currently block the way to practical realization of these systems? 
Much of the technology for DEWs has matured over the last 30 years, reaching a point 
where it could be used by the military, given the right mission set. Previously, and to a 
lesser extent now, the size, weight, and power requirements of a DEW system were a 
hindrance to practical operational use. Ethical considerations are discussed in 2.1.4. 
2.1.3 Arguments 
What arguments are being made for and against DEW systems? Proponents in 
favor of DEW systems have not changed their selling points in any meaningful way over 
the years. Alexander (2008) explains the attractiveness of DEWs as scalability, speed-of-
light engagement, low-cost per shot, extremely precise targeting, and unlimited 
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magazine. Scalability refers to the potential to dial the power up to burn through targets 
or dial it down to do just enough damage to cause mission failure. Adjusting power is a 
simplification of what the operator does to the focus of the beam by manipulating the 
intensity, duration, and wavelength of the beam. Scalability on its own offers a 
uniqueness not seen in conventional weapons. A conventional projectile has predictable 
behavior once it is fired. The scalability factor of a DEW allows the same weapon system 
to be used for multiple scenarios. 
Alexander (2008) also explains what is probably the second biggest selling point 
of DEWs – the engagement speed. Conventional weapons take time to reach the target 
and depend on things like speed of jet engines or rocket propulsion, detonation of 
gunpowder, or ballistic velocity. DEWs, on the other hand, can hit the target almost 
instantaneously after acquisition. The operator can place energy on target at the speed of 
light, matching the speed of the other parts of the detect-to-kill chain. 
The low-cost per shot of a DEW compared to a conventional weapon is explained 
with a Javelin missile example. Whereas the shoulder fired Javelin missile costs over 
$100,000, firing a DEW at the same target has a cost only of the energy it uses. 
Comparatively, the DEW is magnitudes cheaper to fire than conventional weapons. 
Similarly, a DEW’s magazine load is essentially limited by the amount of available 
energy or power source. The exception to both points are chemical-based lasers, which 
need the chemical in order to function. Finally, a DEW is extremely precise in its 
targeting. It is as simple as keeping the beam pointed directly on the target. 
Detractors of DEW systems tell a different story. The advantages of DEWs are 
agreed upon, but the benefits do not paint the full picture. A DEW’s speed-of-light 
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engagement does not mean the target will be destroyed or disabled instantaneously. It 
means the beam can reach the target at the speed of light. There is still time needed to 
have effects upon the target. 
Another major negative characteristic of DEWs are their sensitivity to 
atmospheric conditions such as dust, moisture, and turbulence (Alexander, 2008). 
Anything less than an ideal atmosphere can lead to a weakening of the beam and 
reduction or elimination of the DEW’s intended effects on the target. By virtue of DEWs 
being beams of energy, they are also strictly line-of-sight weapons and have no indirect 
fire capability. This could potentially be a problem when the operator is in a defilade or 
behind cover, forcing them into a less secure position for the sake of firing the DEW. 
The size and weight of DEWs are also an issue. In general, a more powerful laser 
system will be larger and heavier than a less powerful system. This can pose problems 
when attempting to integrate powerful DEWs with a smaller vehicle or person. In 
essence, the mobility of powerful DEWs can be prohibitive. More powerful DEWs also 
use more power, resulting in the need for a larger power source and thus a larger 
platform. The issue of ricochet must also be considered. On the positive side, DEWs are 
extremely precise. However, lasers and other energy beams are not totally absorbed by 
the material they encounter. When the energy is reflected away, it must go somewhere, 
thus potentially causing unintended damage away from the target. 
2.1.4 Ethical Concerns 
Physical characteristics are not the only concerns with DEWs. As with any new 
weapon system, there are bound to be ethical debates and discussions on proper use. 
DEWs, particularly laser weapons, are addressed in the Protocol of Blinding Lasers, part 
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of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949. This protocol 
prohibits deliberate and permanent blinding by lasers on the battlefield (Backstrom & 
Henderson, 2012). This means lasers are permitted under law, with the only prohibition 
being deliberate, permanent blindness. Many militaries use lasers as range finders or may 
utilize optical dazzlers. These devices work well as intended, but could be used to cause 
blindness if operated outside the normal specifications, such as too close to a target or 
aiming directly into a person’s eyes. 
Critics envisioned DEWs being used in space and pushed for a ban on weapons in 
space (Levi, 1983). There are still no laws banning the use of DEWs in space, only 
Article IV of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty that bans nuclear or other weapons of mass 
destruction from orbit (Dembling & Arons, 1967). This alludes to a possible legal hurdle 
for DEWs: their potential for dual purpose use in armed conflict (Leins, 2016). 
The advent of DEWs also brought concerns of ethical employment of such 
weapons. Numerous studies have been inconclusive and erred on the side of negligible 
effects of low-level radio frequency energy on humans (Jauchem, 2008). This includes 
exposure to radio-frequency energy such as cell phones, microwaves, and radio 
transmissions. All these exposures are inadvertent and generally unavoidable. However, 
DEWs would be directed at individuals for the purpose of causing an effect. Rapid 
changes in technology resulting from ongoing research quickly adds more complexities 
to the ethics debate. There are ongoing tests of optogenetics on mice that have shown 
light delivery technology can manipulate their brain cell function. Such a weapon would 
certainly have legal and ethical implications if directed against humans (Leins, 2016). 
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2.1.5 Today’s DEWs 
There are several weapons either currently in use or that have been tested and 
fielded that can be classified as DEWs. They are split between two of the most prominent 
directed energy technologies: high-energy lasers (HELs) and high-powered microwaves 
(HPMs) (Sanyal, Bevington, & Brigham, 2017). Since lasers are already used by the 
military for a variety of purposes, HELs emerged as leading contender for DEWs. HELs 
extend the capability of existing lasers by essentially increasing the power ranges to 
achieve more effects. The four main approaches to HELs are solid-state, fiber, chemical, 
and free electron (Sanyal et al., 2017), which are all infrared. HPMs, on the other hand, 
use microwave or radio-wave frequency ranges. These offer some of the same benefits of 
HELs such as active denial and other non-lethal effects. Scaled up in power, the same 
beam can be used in a lethal capacity (Sanyal et al., 2017). 
The Active Denial System (ADS) is a non-lethal, counter-personnel, vehicle 
mounted system created by Raytheon. Antal (2013) describes the system as one of the 
first such systems fielded by the Army. Tested and shown to have a range of 
approximately one mile, the ADS directs a high frequency beam of 95GHz waves at a 
person or group of people. The energy is invisible to the target person or group and 
causes intense uncomfortableness within a few seconds by way of heating the skin. In 
this manner, targets are obliged to leave the area. Throughout rigorous testing, the system 
was shown to be non-lethal, but there are still doubts as to the effects over a longer time. 
Antal (2013) also notes the ADS’s fielding in Afghanistan with the Army in 2010, even 
though it was never used. In a 2012 demonstration, the Marines seemed to embrace the 
ADS more than the Army. 
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A design of experiments was conducted to test the methodology for the 
effectiveness of non-lethal weapons in a crowd scenario. The experiment showed a long-
range DEW suppressed the crowd the most. Through the breadth of the experiment, the 
long-range DEW showed statistically significant differences on all measures of 
effectiveness (Mezzacappa et al., 2017). However, the authors noted that the experiment 
results should not be used to draw conclusions about the effectiveness of any particular 
weapon type as the experiment focused on the methodology. 
The Mobile Experimental High Energy Laser (MEHEL) is Stryker mounted 
mobile testbed to support the Army’s laser programs (Pina, 2017). Pina further describes 
the MEHEL as a 5kW system designed to defeat small unmanned aircraft system (sUAS) 
threats. Its $30 per shot cost is calculated by the amount of diesel fuel needed to power 
the shot. In 2017, the latest version of the MEHEL operated from a combat vehicle 
successfully defeated a sUAS. A potential use for the MEHEL is defeating sUAS 
swarms, although more testing is needed. 
One DEW system has been operationalized aboard the USS Ponce in the Persian 
Gulf (Coffey, 2014). The Laser Weapon System (LaWS) was installed on the ship in 
2014 and has been tested and used aboard ever since. The DEW was designed to be 
operated by a single sailor using a controller similar to the ones found on the Xbox and 
PlayStation game systems (Coffey, 2014). Coffey (2014) also explains how the LaWS 
integrates six solid-state infrared beams, which can be modified from low to high power 
for warning or target destruction. The system is mounted on a pre-existing Phalanx gun 
system, thus removing the need for an entirely new platform and tracking system 
(Gunzinger & Dougherty, 2012). 
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2.1.6 Tomorrow’s DEWs 
Other DEWs are still in the development process as engineers work to improve 
previous systems while learning from their failures and successes. The engineers and 
their military customers are working to synchronize technological feasibility with mission 
need. This effort goes hand-in-hand with the military’s analysis of the changing threats 
and where they see DEWs fitting into the equation. 
 The HEL systems mentioned earlier are universally confined by their size, 
weight, and power consumption (SWaP) limitations (Coffey, 2014). In response to these 
limitations, a Dayton, OH based company, Optonicus, developed an optical phased array 
for the U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). This array was 
made specifically for DARPA’s Excalibur program and featured low power 
requirements, long-range turbulence correction, and scalability. The system was tested 
and shown to compensate for atmospheric aberrations. However, the most intriguing 
aspect was the system’s ability to do so in a package 10 times lighter and more compact 
than previous HELs (Coffey, 2014). 
The DEW programs mentioned thus far offer warfighters capabilities different 
than those currently in their arsenal. However, an ongoing issue is matching those 
capabilities to operational requirements (Stoudt, 2012). The gap between engineers and 
operators often prevents DEWs from being fully utilized, even when fielded. Staying 
with this theme, a lack of formal requirements has created a situation where the 
technology is pushed by the developers rather than pulled by the operators (Stoudt, 
2012). 
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Some of the suggested missions for DEWs have not changed much over the years. 
Others are being realized as well-suited for DEW. These missions include defending 
infrastructure such as power plants, performing non-lethal engagements like crowd 
control, and attacking targets in an urban environment (Zimet & Mann, 2009). As warfare 
evolves and the threat scenarios change, DEWs with a lower power output could possibly 
be used alongside conventional weapons. This is a shift from the elusive 100kWh HEL 
often talked about as the goal for laser DEWs (Zimet & Mann, 2009). Welch et al. (2007) 
suggests there is not much reason to continue trying to field high-powered lasers until the 
operational demands generate priorities. Likewise, they suggest that fragmented efforts in 
science and technology projects should move to specific research and development 
programs that can lead to fielded systems. 
2.2 Acquisition Programs 
 Military acquisition is more than just purchasing an item. Acquisition is a broader 
term that covers the process to design, engineer, construct, test, deploy, and sustain an 
item (Schwartz, 2014). The entire process is sometimes described as long and arduous 
because it must follow statutes and regulations laid out to ensure such processes have 
well-defined structure and accountability. A weapon system must go through three steps: 
identifying a required need, establishing a budget, and acquiring the system (Schwartz, 
2014). The entire acquisition process has been lambasted numerous times for being slow, 
overly bureaucratic, and ineffective. Despite discussions to overhaul the process, it 
remains essentially unchanged. Schwartz (2014) does an excellent job summarizing the 
acquisitions process and much of the following paragraphs are attributed to his work. 
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2.2.1 Identifying a Requirement 
 In 2003, the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) was 
created as a new process to identify, assess, and prioritize which capabilities the military 
requires. This new process was a shift in approaches from threat-based to capabilities-
based. In short, needed capabilities were identified to fit priorities based on high-level 
strategy and guidance documents such as the National Defense Strategy. The previous 
process developed and fielded systems based on perceived threats to the nation. A 
primary reason for making the change was to develop systems that could be used jointly 
so unnecessary time and money was not spent on separate systems that filled the same 
capabilities gap. 
2.2.2 Budgeting 
 The Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) system is an 
annual process that aims to work within fiscal constraints to provide a mix of forces, 
equipment, manpower, and support. The planning stage is where the national defense 
strategy is laid out and priorities for programs are developed. The programming stage is 
where missions and objectives of weapons programs are submitted, along with a 
proposed budget. The budgeting stage occurs simultaneously but separately from the 
actual program proposals. Once a program decision is made or a budget review is 
conducted, the budget decision is issued. Finally, the execution stage takes place. In this 
stage, programs are evaluated against metrics, including funding obligations. 
2.2.3 Acquisition 
 The Defense Acquisition System is a general framework that is intended to work 
with all manner of programs, from missiles, to information technology, to vehicles and 
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weapon systems. Program development times are not uniform and vary greatly (Van Atta, 
2013). Scheduling is often overly ambitious or unrealistic given the nature of the 
technology within the program. DEWs fall prey to this situation due to the complex 
nature and employment of the technology involved. Major systems development takes an 
average of seven to ten years (Van Atta, 2013). 
2.2.4 Evaluation of Acquisition Programs 
 All programs must meet specific requirements throughout the process to continue 
to the subsequent phase. These are known as Milestone A, B, and C. Milestone A 
happens pre-systems acquisition and initiates technology maturation and risk reduction. 
Milestone B happens at the end of pre-systems acquisition directly before the start of 
systems acquisition and initiates engineering and manufacturing development. Milestone 
C initiates production and deployments and occurs during systems acquisition. 
Acquisition is broken into five phases: materiel solution analysis, technology maturation 
and risk reduction, engineering and manufacturing development, production and 
deployment, and operations and support. Figure 3 shows the interaction between the 
milestones and phases. 
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Figure 3. Acquisition Phases and Milestones (Defense Acquisition University, 2017) 
 
 The three milestones determine if a program has met the exit requirements of the 
current phase and can continue to the next phase. Formal evaluation standards are not 
spelled out due to the differing nature of unlike programs. Instead, each program manager 
and Milestone Decision Authority are given the brunt of the task to ensure developmental 
test and evaluation people have adequately evaluated their program (Defense Acquisition 
University, 2017). This research can be used to fill the void when looking at the HSI 
portion of a DEW acquisition program. 
2.3 Human Systems Integration 
According to the Air Force HSI Handbook, “HSI is the process by which to 
design and develop systems that effectively and affordably integrate human capabilities 
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and limitations” (Department of the Air Force, 2009). Similarly, Air Force Instruction 63-
1201 defines HSI as, “A disciplined, unified, and interactive systems engineering 
approach to integrate human considerations into system development, design, and 
lifecycle management to improve total system performance and reduce costs of 
ownership” (Department of the Air Force, 2007). In both cases and throughout various 
other organizations’ definitions, HSI boils down to seamlessly meshing human and 
system for better performance and reduced costs. HSI covers a wide range of factors that 
the Air Force divides into nine domains: manpower, personnel, training (MPT), human 
factors engineering, environment, safety, occupational health (ESOH), survivability, and 
habitability. The HSI domains are defined with liberal help from the HSI Domain Guide 
(Carr & Greene, 2009a). 
Manpower: The manpower domain addresses both the number and type of 
personnel required. It covers the occupational specialties (may be multiple specialties) 
needed to train, operate, maintain, and support the developed system. The domain ties in 
with other domains in its pursuit of engineering designs that optimize the use of 
manpower for the purpose of keeping human resource costs within reason. The 
determination of manpower levels and their associated positions must also account for the 
cognitive, physical, and physiological demands on humans. Considerations must be made 
for the technological impact possibilities on humans integrated into a system. Human 
resources is a related but not identical field. 
Personnel: The personnel domain addresses all things a human is required to 
possess to operate, maintain, and support the system. This includes their knowledge, 
skills, and abilities (KSAs); experience; and aptitudes. Human aptitudes include such 
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things as cognitive, physical, and sensory capabilities. The domain also considers the 
means to recruit and retain the people. Systems requirements drive recruitment, testing, 
qualification, and selection. The personnel domain works by defining human 
performance characteristics and then determining target populations for select 
occupational specialties. This includes the management of said occupational specialties 
for career progression and assignments. The domain can impact both manpower and 
training. The domain can also act as a driving force for design requirements. Like the 
manpower domain, human resources is a related but not identical field. Human resources 
can be thought of an overarching domain that contains both manpower and personnel. 
Training: The training domain addresses all resources and instruction required to 
provide personnel (identified in the personnel domain) with the KSAs to operate, 
maintain, and support the system. This includes both individual and collective training, as 
well as both qualification training and proficiency training. Emphasis should be placed on 
training options that enhance the population’s capabilities, maintain skills, are 
comparatively fast, and use an optimal mix of training resources. All training systems and 
materials should be developed concurrently with the system. The fielding of the training 
system may be required prior to the actual system so personnel can operate, maintain, and 
support the system when it is fielded. 
Human Factors Engineering (HFE, referred to in this research simply as Human 
Factors): The human factors domain involves the understanding and integration of human 
capabilities into system design. Human capabilities include cognitive, physical, sensory, 
and team dynamic. The integration must take place at the onset of the system design and 
continue through system disposal. The main goal is to effectively integrate the human-
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system interfaces so system performance can be optimized. System functions should be 
designed with a comprehensive human factors analysis so system requirements and 
functions align. Human factors account for increasingly complex technology and the 
demands on people. Human factors increase usability for system users by minimizing 
design characteristics that lead to errors. The domain also helps to eliminate the need for 
design work-arounds. 
 Environment: The environment domain considers the relationships that exist 
between all living things and systems with water, land, air, space, cyberspace, markets, 
and organizations. A goal is to protect the environment from system design, 
manufacturing, operations, sustainment, and disposal activities. These considerations 
could affect the concept of operations and requirements. 
Safety: The safety domain promotes design characteristics that directly affect the 
potential for death or injury to operators, maintainers, and support personnel in the form 
of reduced accidents or mishaps. In the same vein, the design characteristics reduce the 
potential for cascading failures within the system and in other systems. Lessons learned 
from previous systems are heavily utilized so design features prevent hazards where 
possible and minimize risk where prevention is unattainable. Redundant systems are key, 
as are systems that alert the user when a problem exists. Systems that assist in avoiding 
and recovering from errors are also part of the safety domain. A few examples of 
widespread issues are: factors that threaten the safe operation of the system; walking and 
working surfaces; pressure extremes; and control of hazardous energy releases such as 
mechanical, electrical, fluids under pressure, ionizing or non-ionizing radiation, fire, and 
explosions. 
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Occupational Health: The occupational health domain enhances job performance 
of operators, maintainers, and support personnel by promoting system design features 
that minimize the risk of injury, acute or chronic illness, and disability. When health 
hazards cannot be avoided, the domain recommends personal protective equipment, 
protective enclosures, or mitigation measures. Some common issues include noise, 
chemical exposures, atmospheric hazards like oxygen deficiency, vibration, and both 
ionizing and non-ionizing radiation. Additionally, there are human factors to be 
considered that could result in chronic disease or discomfort. An example is repetitive 
motion injuries. 
Survivability: The survivability domain helps reduce injury and loss of the 
system. Any characteristic that enables the total system to be less susceptible to mission 
degradation or termination, injury or loss of life to users, or partial or complete loss of the 
system and its components is part of survivability. Some characteristics include life 
support, body armor, helmets, plating, egress/ejection equipment, air bags, seat belts, and 
electronic shielding. These concerns must be addressed with the total concept of 
operations in mind and for all users, operators, maintainers, and support personnel. 
Habitability: The habitability domain covers system working and living 
conditions. Some examples are lighting, ventilation, adequate space, vibration, noise, and 
temperature control, as well as the availability of medical care, food and/or drink 
services, suitable sleeping quarters, sanitation, and personal hygiene facilities. These 
types of characteristics are necessary for personnel and impact recruitment and retention 
(personnel domain). Overall system performance is influenced by its personnel and their 
level of morale, motivation, quality of life, safety, health, and comfort. 
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2.3.1 Importance of HSI 
Failure to address HSI concerns at the inception of the systems engineering 
process causes HSI attributes to not be deeply implemented in the systems engineering 
process (Bodenhamer, 2012). This may seem like a trivial point, until compared with a 
typical system’s life-cycle cost as shown in Figure 4. As depicted, the cost to change 
design direction [or implement additional HSI measures] increases significantly as the 
process moves forward. In other words, the life-cycle cost of a system is essentially 
locked in early in the process, thereby making it difficult to change anything moving 
forward past the original design. This contrasts with the actual system costs (lower curve) 
that rise much slower over time. Both curves eventually meet at the end of the life-cycle, 
meaning much of the life-cycle cost is realized near the end of the useful life of the 
system. Onkham et al. (2012) recognized the need to address human factors, one of the 
HSI domains, to produce desired outputs on costs associated with human capability, 
human reliability, and decision making. Addressing these factors at the beginning of a 
process reduces risk, uncertainty, and total ownership cost (TOC). 
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Figure 4. Life Cycle Cost Impacts from Early Phase Decision-Making (adapted) from the 
Systems Engineering Handbook, Volume 3.1 (as cited in Silva-Martinez, 2016) 
 
2.3.1.1 Case Study 1: HSI Lessons Learned from UAVs  
Tvaryanas et al. (2005) found that 60.2% of UAV mishaps involved human 
factors. The study looked at 221 UAV mishaps categorized by the DoD’s mishap 
classifications (Department of Defense, 2011). The mishaps totaled more than $151.5 
million in damages (Feltman, Curry, & Kelley, 2018), in today’s dollars. The study 
recognized the “tendency to consider complex systems as “technology” driven rather than 
“people-technology” driven. Improvement of technology generally means more complex 
systems, which increases the chance for failures associated with both human and 
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mechanical causes. They highlight a case study on UAVs that calls attention to the 
UAVs’ high mishap rate as compared to general aviation. Comparing the 32 mishaps per 
100,000 flight hours of the Air Force’s RQ-1 Predator to general aviation’s 1 mishap per 
100,000 flight hours shows that UAV reliability is orders of magnitude worse than 
general aviation. It could be argued that a higher mishap rate for an unmanned vehicle is 
less important than a manned vehicle because of the absence of a human pilot being 
affected by the mishap. However, the DoD recognizes “the reliability and sustainability 
of UAVs is vitally important because it underlies their affordability (an acquisition issue), 
their mission availability (an operations and logistics issue), and their acceptance into 
civil airspace (a regulatory issue)” (Defense Science Board, 2004). Table 1 shows the 
summary of UAV mishaps by human factors taxonomies. 
 
Table 1. Summary of Prior UAV Mishap Studies Using 
Standardized Human Factors Taxonomies (Tvaryanas et al., 2005) 
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 Tvaryanas et al. (2005) uses data from Table 1 combined with their own analysis 
to gain several insights into the role of human factors in UAV mishaps. Figure 5 uses the 
Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) to display human causal 
factors of UAV mishaps. The highest percentage of mishaps were due to organizational 
influences. This could possibly be traced back to the initial phases of development when 
HSI could have played a role in shaping the design of and training for the system. 
 
 
Figure 5. Top Level HFACS Human Causal Factors by Military Service as Percentage of 
Total Mishaps (Tvaryanas et al., 2005) 
 
 Of note, the organizational influences category includes resource/acquisition 
management and was the most frequent type of latent failure, present in 79.4% of human 
causal factors mishaps in the Air Force (Tvaryanas et al., 2005). Tvaryanas et al. (2005) 
“summarizes the root categories of acts as a percentage of the total acts by service” in 
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Figure 6, where it can be seen that the Air Force has a higher percentage (47.2%) of skill-
based errors than the other services. 
 
 
Figure 6. Root Categories of Acts as Percentage of Total Acts by Service (Tvaryanas et 
al., 2005) 
 
Figure 7 shows UAV mishaps by the more familiar HSI domains. The human 
factors domain easily outpaced all other domains as containing the most mishaps. Within 
human factors, 60% of Air Force mishaps involved organizational interfaces failures 
(Tvaryanas et al., 2005). Tvaryanas (2005) notes the consistent findings showing a higher 
frequency of Air Force mishaps can be traced directly to acquisition failures tied to 
subsystem component reliability problems. 
“The excessive numbers of mechanical failures analyzed in the UAV 
Reliability Study are physical manifestations of a recurring latent failure in 
the acquisitions process. To effectively address current UAV mishap rates 
and safeguard investments in future UAV systems, the investigational 
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spotlight must move from mechanical failures as the cause of UAV mishaps 
to failures in the organizational culture, management, or structure of DoD’s 
acquisition processes for UAVs.” (Tvaryanas et al., 2005) 
 
 
Figure 7. HSI Domains/Interfaces by Service as Percentage 
of Total Mishaps (Tvaryanas et al., 2005) 
 
2.3.1.2 Case Study 2: HSI Success Story of F119 Engine 
When Lockheed won the initial $13.7 billion [in today’s dollars] contract in 1991 
(Donley v. Lockheed Martin Corp, 2010) to develop the next-generation stealth fighter, 
the F-22, the Secretary of the Air Force noted one reason was due to its superior engines 
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(Bolkcom, 2007). A reason for the increased attention to engines was the F-15’s F100 
engine service record. Although high performing, the F100 was prone to failure and the 
resulting downtime needed for maintenance (Liu et al., 2010). The Air Force 
subsequently implemented the Reliability, Maintainability, and Sustainability (RM&S) 
program in 1984, soon after work began developing the F-22. Pratt & Whitney, 
developers of the F119 engine, realized the importance of this program and pushed to use 
HSI as a way to make their engine more reliable. 
Seven of the nine HSI domains were represented by organizations within Pratt & 
Whitney (Liu et al., 2010). The Chief Engineer of the F119, Frank Gillette, was the 
driving force behind the incorporation of HSI principles, which in turn led to adherence 
to the Air Force’s RM&S program. It took constant leadership intervention and 
adherence to policies to move forward with development of the engine while maintaining 
an eye on both RM&S and HSI. 
The competition between Pratt & Whitney and General Electric to develop the F-
22’s engine was eventually won by Pratt & Whitney. After both companies were awarded 
money to continue their development, Pratt & Whitney chose to devote double the test 
hours as General Electric, with an emphasis on meeting the RM&S guidelines. General 
Electric ended up developing a superior engine in terms of performance while Pratt & 
Whitney had a slightly less performance-based engine that more closely aligned to 
RM&S through the use of HSI (Liu et al., 2010). 
The integration of RM&S into Pratt & Whitney’s development process showed 
that even separate organizations working together could successfully consider and apply 
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HSI. Liu et al. (2010) identified three factors as key to the success of HSI within systems 
engineering of the F119 program: 
1. Air Force policy to elevate the visibility of HSI 
2. Pratt & Whitney’s willingness to internalize HSI 
practices and enforce accountability for HSI 
3. The integration of HSI and systems engineering in the 
early phases of the acquisition life cycle 
The fact that HSI considerations were coupled with other systems engineering practices 
was a strength of the project. The lack of a centralized “HSI group” did not detract from 
the project’s goal of meeting Air Force requirements of RM&S (Liu et al., 2010). 
2.3.2 HSI Implementation 
Airbus Defense and Space looked at their current enterprise architecture 
philosophy and realized it did not provide sufficient weight to the human aspects of 
existing architectures or to proposed changes to current products. The resulting 
investigation prompted integrating more HSI (areas that were not covered by their 
existing human view architecture) into different areas of their model based system 
engineering process (Sharples, 2015). A different study integrated HSI concepts, 
specifically human factors, in the early design stages of a nuclear main control room. It 
recognized the importance of correctly identifying and implementing high-level 
requirements early in the design to avoid continual updates (Yan, Habiyaremye, Wei, & 
Tran, 2017). 
Looking past successful uses of integrating the human factors domain of HSI into 
developing better functioning systems, there have also been studies on the research-
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practice gap. This is the gap that exists when practitioners or operators do not heed the 
recommendations of researchers on the subject. Specifically reviewing human factors, the 
study showed journal publications over the last 50 years have shown an increase in the 
number of articles that use theory. There is evidence that the research-practice gap is 
shrinking, yet still present (Chung & Williamson, 2017). 
2.4 Decision Analysis Using VFT 
Parnell et al. (2013) introduces, defines, and explains decision analysis and VFT 
in depth within Handbook of Decision Analysis. At its core, they state that decision 
analysis is “a philosophy and social-technical process to create value for decision-makers 
and stakeholders facing difficult decisions involving multiple stakeholders, multiple 
(possibly conflicting) objectives, complex alternatives, important uncertainties, and 
significant consequences.” They continue by saying that VFT is a “philosophical 
approach to the analysis of decisions” that creates decision-making opportunities by 
using the value to generate better alternatives. Keeney (1992) refers to VFT as thinking 
that focuses first on values and later on alternatives that might achieve them. This is in 
contrast to alternative-focused thinking (AFT), which compares available alternatives. 
Parnell et al. (2013) notes that a decision is “an irrevocable allocation of resources.” 
From the stated definitions, it can be seen that VFT can be used by decision-makers to 
allocate resources effectively. 
Although not utilized in this research, a key component of VFT allows decision-
makers to generate alternatives, as opposed to only comparing pre-existing alternatives. 
For example, a decision-maker would be able to choose the best alternative given A, B, 
and C. However, if A, B, and C are the only choices, the decision-maker can never do 
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better than the best of those choices. VFT lets the decision-maker see those alternatives 
and analyze hybrids of those alternatives to generate new alternatives. Now, given A, B, 
C, and D, the decision-maker could choose D, whereas before that was not an option. 
Kirkwood (1996) defines decision analysis slightly differently. A decision implies 
the existence of alternatives. Significant decisions result in differing outcomes and the 
more diverse the outcomes, the more complex the analysis (Kirkwood, 1996). Decision 
analysis is a process used to create value for decision-makers (DM) faced with difficult 
decisions that have complex alternatives, more than one objective, and substantial 
consequences. It must be noted that good decisions can have bad outcomes. Even a 
decision made logically and consistent with the DM’s preferences may have a bad 
outcome, just like a poor decision process can sometimes lead to a good outcome (Parnell 
et al., 2013). One way to conduct decision analysis is through the use of VFT. 
 The VFT approach uses quantitative measures to give each alternative a score. In 
this way, alternatives can be numerically ranked against each other. A value hierarchy is 
used to organize evaluation considerations. These areas of concern are structured in such 
a way so they feed into each other from bottom to top. 
 The 10-step process summarized in Figure 8 is usually employed to use VFT 
(Shoviak, 2001). Step 1, problem identification, involves clearly defining the problem 
within the correct frame, perspective, and scope. Step 2, identify and structure objectives, 
is where the DM’s values are represented in the value hierarchy. This information can 
come directly from the DM (platinum standard), official documents (gold standard), or 
from representatives of the DM (silver standard). Platinum standard is preferred over 
gold, which is preferred over silver. Step 3, measure the achievement of objectives, is the 
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process of creating evaluation measures to garner a raw score. Step 4, single attribute 
value function (SAVF), uses the evaluation measures of step 3 to define a function that 
converts raw numbers to a value score. Step 5, multi attribute value function (MAVF), 
adds a weight to each evaluation measure so it can be compared with every other 
evaluation measure with the DM’s corresponding preferences. Step 6, alternative 
generation and screening, finds or generates alternatives that will be scored in step 7, 
alternative scoring. Alternative scores are computed by multiplying value scores by their 
weight. Step 8, deterministic analysis, and step 9, sensitivity analysis, are used to evaluate 
each alternative’s results. Lastly, step 10, communicating results, allows the analyst to 
share the results with the DM.  
 
 
Figure 8. VFT Steps (Shoviak, 2001) 
 
2.4.1 Case Study: Foundations 2025 
 In the late 1990s, a study was directed by the Air Force Chief of Staff called Air 
Force 2025. The more than year-long study’s goal was to identify system concepts and 
technologies for the United States Air Force to achieve air and space dominance by the 
Step 1. Problem Identification 
Step 2. Identify & Structure Objectives 
Step 3. Measure the Achievement of Objectives 
Step 4. Single Attribute Value Function 
Step 5. Multi Attribute Value Function 
Step 6. Alternative Generation 
Step 7. Alternative Scoring 
Step 8. Deterministic Analysis 
Step 9. Sensitivity Analysis 
Step 10. Communicating Results 
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year 2025. A VFT model named Foundations 2025 was used successfully to score 43 
system concepts (Parnell, Conley, Jackson, Lehmkuhl, & Andrew, 1998). 
 Parnell et al.’s (1998) study was split into four phases: preparation, idea 
generation, assimilation, and operations analysis. An introduction to VFT and its uses 
was provided to all the study participants during the preparation phase. Idea generation 
brought system concepts and assimilation identified requirements for the concepts and 
determined which concepts met those requirements. The final phase was conducted 
concurrently with the previous three phases. The model itself was used to evaluate the 
final system concepts. 
 The search for gold standard documents proved insufficient in detail to create a 
value hierarchy so the silver standard approach was used instead. The investigating team 
asked participants to identify tasks needed to provide air and space dominance by 2025. 
Affinity diagrams were used to group similar verbs (tasks), which were then structured 
further. Using the affinity diagram, tasks were sorted separately by participants. Next, 
tasks were analyzed to determine duplicates, combined when needed, and further 
categorized into subtasks, tasks, and functions. 
Parnell et al.’s (1998) team spent considerable time determining attributes and 
evaluation measures for each subtask. The attributes described a system’s ability to 
accomplish a subtask while the evaluation measures quantified system performance. 
Operational experts were used to develop the SAVFs and determine weights. The study 
itself also identified six alternate futures of the state of the Earth to take into account 
differing possible requirements in the future. To account for this in the model, the teams 
involved in the study independently submitted weights for each alternate future. The 
 40 
average weight for each future was used in the model. Operational analysis and 
technology teams then scored each system concept, which resulted in a full list of concept 
systems ranked against one another. 
The model successfully used VFT as a methodology and proved to be effective 
for a large scale, complex, and long-term planning horizon problem. The five tier, 134 
evaluation measure model objectively analyzed future system concepts and avoided 
institutional bias. It proves VFT can be used for concept systems or programs. 
2.4.2 Experts 
This research for this thesis relied heavily on experts, who are different than 
novices and other nonexperts. Experts do not necessarily have more ability than a novice; 
they simply have more specialized knowledge (Proctor & Van Zandt, 2008). An expert 
can be described as someone who has special knowledge of a specific domain such as 
HSI or DEWs. Chi et al. (1981) details expert characteristics in Table 2. As detailed in 
the table, experts are not shown to have greater abilities than a novice. Instead, they are 
able to draw upon their specific knowledge of a subject and perform better when working 
with subject specific problems or tasks. 
 
Table 2. Characteristics of Expert Performance (Chi et al., 1981) 
1. Experts excel mainly in their domains. 
2. Experts perceive large meaningful patterns in their domain. 
3. Experts are fast; they are faster than novices at performing the skills 
of their domain, and they quickly solve problems with little error. 
4. Experts have superior short-term and long-term memory for material 
in their domain. 
5. Experts see and represent a problem in their domain at a deeper (more 
principled) level than novices; novices tend to represent a problem at 
a superficial level. 
6. Experts spend a great deal of time analyzing a problem qualitatively. 
7. Experts have more accurate self-monitoring skills. 
8. Experts are good at selecting the most appropriate strategies to use in 
a situation. 
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2.4.3 Tacit Knowledge 
 Another aspect of experts is their tacit knowledge. Objective knowledge can be 
thought of as knowledge that can be readily communicated and understood. Tacit 
knowledge is the opposite, and it is often difficult or impossible to communicate. Other 
characteristics of tacit knowledge are that it is highly individualized, practical, and 
specific (Ambrosini & Bowman, 2001). For the expert possessing tacit knowledge, their 
thought process goes through steps that the expert themselves may be unable to articulate. 
It is such an engrained piece of knowledge that the expert is unable to completely define 
or articulate their thought process, thus meeting the definition of tacit knowledge. Tacit 
knowledge is not restricted to experts only; novices and anyone in between possess it 
(Balu & Anchalia, 2015). 
2.4.4 Value Hierarchy as a Knowledge Repository 
There are different ways to store knowledge for subsequent use. A value 
hierarchy created from the first two steps of the VFT process is a way to store domain-
specific knowledge. Knowledge management is a central aspect to many firms’ long-term 
competitive strategies and the same goes for the military. Improved overall performance 
and utilization of competitive advantages are two benefits of good knowledge 
management. Defined as “the explicit and systematic management of vital knowledge – 
and its associated processes of creation, organization, diffusion, use and exploitation” 
(Skyrme, 2001), a knowledge base is inherently linked to knowledge management. A 
value hierarchy essentially acts as a repository for knowledge that can assist experts and 
non-experts alike in making good decisions about a particular issue. The tacit knowledge 
 42 
contained in a value hierarchy “can be a source of advantage because it is unique, 
imperfectly mobile, imperfectly imitable and non-substitutable” (López-Nicolás & 
Meroño-Cerdán, 2011). 
Multiple examples of HSI in various acquisition programs were discussed in the 
literature review. The need for innovation and DEWs as a part of the military’s strategic 
plan and the acquisition process were also covered. Decision analysis using VFT was 
recommended as a way to transfer knowledge specific to an HSI and DEW expert to a 
non-expert. The expert’s knowledge can then be used without the expert being present 
and a DEW acquisition program can be evaluated in terms of HSI content. This enables a 
new team member or person unfamiliar with the inner workings of such a system to step 
in a use the model as a tool to evaluation their input to the program. 
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III. Methodology 
 
It is evident that program managers and the human systems integration (HSI) 
experts themselves face a challenge in balancing total system costs, capabilities, and 
functionality. While the HSI expert is not necessarily responsible for cost, they are not 
excluded from finding reasonable solutions to incorporate the needed HSI aspects into the 
system. Logically, too high a cost without the added benefit will result in certain HSI 
aspects not being incorporated into the system. The result would be at best, degraded 
performance, or at worst, a system that did not function properly due to human and 
machine not working together appropriately. Value-focused thinking (VFT) is a suitable 
methodology to evaluate this multi-criteria decision analysis problem because it is good 
with complex, multi-faceted problems. 
This chapter will discuss VFT, the types of knowledge gathered, how to choose 
an expert, elicitation techniques, and interactions with the expert. Next, the how-to of the 
VFT process will be discussed as it relates to DEW acquisition programs and HSI. The 
primary focus of the chapter is knowledge elicitation methods and the application of 
decision analysis (DA) techniques. 
3.1 Value Focused Thinking 
Multi-objective decision analysis combines multiple objectives and values and 
scores alternatives against each other, giving decision-makers (DMs) the opportunity to 
evaluate each alternative objectively. The core of VFT is first understanding your 
objectives and then figuring out how to achieve them (Keeney, 1992). Much of the 
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information contained within a hierarchy comes from an expert or a decision-maker. The 
process of eliciting values and objectives from the decision-maker is a key part of VFT. 
A primary reason for using VFT is the allowance for alternative creation by using 
trade-offs between value and weights. The allowance for alternative creation can come in 
especially handy when faced with specific problems that may have limited scope to begin 
with. This research is on HSI within DEW acquisition programs, which can immediately 
be constrained by a size component. For example, a DEW system needs space not only 
for the weapon system, but the operator as well. The whole system must be examined to 
determine which platforms could be viable candidates to host such a system. In any case, 
there is a minimum amount of space needed for the weapon system as well as operator 
area. The value hierarchy was built with this kind of constraint in mind. 
Works by both Keeney (1992) and Parnell (2013) were used to explain the 
remainder of this section. Initially, identifying or framing the problem is the key to 
moving forward with the model. Incorrect framing can lead to answering the wrong 
question or otherwise overlooking key aspects of the problem. This in turn makes it 
harder for a decision-maker to make a good decision based on the model. Upon 
determining the correct frame, objectives are structured into the value hierarchy, which is 
essentially the heart of VFT. Decision-makers and any other stakeholders must agree in 
principal on the hierarchy as it is the basis for the scoring of alternatives and the end 
decision. The visualization of the model through the hierarchy is another benefit of VFT. 
Like a pyramid or tree, the strategic objective is the uppermost tier and branching out 
below it are the fundamental objectives, or lower tiers. Finally, the fundamental 
objectives are broken down until the objective can be measured. 
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Generally, the VFT process goes sequentially through the 10-step process 
beginning with problem identification and ending with analysis and recommendations. 
The methodology used here was modified based on lack of an actual DEW acquisition 
program to use as inputs. Steps 6-10 were not completed as a result. 
3.2 Knowledge Elicitation 
The VFT process does not work without a strong knowledge source. Whether it 
be the platinum, gold, or silver standard, something must provide the basis for the 
creation of the value hierarchy. The model created used almost exclusively platinum and 
gold sources, lending to its validity. This research used one primary decision-maker who 
was also the subject matter expert (SME). The SME was knowledgeable on the inner 
workings of DEWs, the acquisition process, and HSI. There were some small gaps in 
knowledge as the SME was more familiar with some domains of HSI and slightly less 
familiar with others. The combination of DEW, HSI, and acquisition process expertise 
proved vital to the research. Having a single source for the three knowledge sets helped 
later in the process to determine what was important. A second SME was brought in 
midway through the research to provide additional input and perspective. The second 
SME shared the same knowledge base, albeit from a different background. As such, the 
two SMEs provided varying perspectives while fundamentally agreeing on all major 
aspects of the research. 
3.2.1 Tacit vs Explicit Knowledge 
Obtaining explicit knowledge, or the kind of knowledge that can be codified and 
written down, is inherently easier than obtaining tacit knowledge. By its very definition, 
tacit knowledge cannot be easily obtained or written down. The collection and 
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codification of tacit knowledge essentially transforms the knowledge from tacit to 
explicit. 
In the context of the research, explicit knowledge was the primary source of 
information. However, the SMEs had years of experience that in and of itself lent 
credence to the assertion that the SMEs possessed tacit knowledge. Bad or otherwise 
incomplete knowledge can significantly affect the ability of the VFT model to function 
properly and provide useful results. 
3.2.2 Choosing the Expert 
This research was developed by a sponsoring agency, the 711th Human 
Performance Wing (HPW), with an individual in mind to act as the lead. While often 
times the decision-maker is chosen by virtue of their position within the organization, this 
is not always the case with experts. The primary sponsor of this research also served as 
decision-maker and expert. Pace (as cited in Lavin et al., 2007) uses the Department of 
Defense’s definition to describe a subject matter expert (SME) as “an individual who, by 
virtue of position, education, training, or experience, is expected to have greater-than-
normal expertise or insight relative to a particular technical or operational discipline, 
system, or process, and who has been selected or appointed to participate in development, 
verification, validation, accreditation, or use of a model or simulation.” The sponsor fits 
this definition by virtue of all four descriptors in the Department of Defense’s definition. 
He is a retired Air Force Colonel (O-6) currently working in a Scientist & Engineer 
position at an O-5 equivalent level as a Human Systems Integration Consultant. His 
education includes a Doctor of Optometry, PhD in Physiological Optics, and an HSI 
certificate. His served 22 years on active duty with various positions relating to 
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optometry, lasers, vision, and HSI. In total, he has 18+ years working on HSI issues with 
five years having a direct influence on acquisition programs. The various assignments, 
education, and skills gained over the years have given him more than enough pedigree to 
be called an expert. 
3.2.3 Knowledge Elicitation Technique 
There are many methods to eliciting knowledge, each with their own advantages 
and disadvantages (Proctor & Van Zandt, 2008). Although all the methods are too 
numerous to discuss here, several were considered for use. Interviews, case studies, 
protocols, observation, sorting, and document analysis were all considered as viable 
approaches. However, observation was ruled out due to time constraints and lack of a 
specific ongoing DEW acquisition program to observe. Case studies were ruled out due 
to lack of published literature on the specific subject. Finally, the well-known and 
popular technique of expert interviews was chosen as the primary knowledge elicitation 
technique. 
Related to interviews is the verbal protocol analysis method, which differs from 
interviews in that the expert reports their thought process for a particular task instead of 
answering a series of questions. Hoffman et al. (2006) conducted a series of studies that 
showed both think-aloud problem solving combined with protocol analysis and 
unstructured interviews were time consuming and had a low yield of less than one 
informative proposition per minute. The most efficient methods yielded between one and 
two informative propositions per minute and included structured interviews, a 
constrained processing task, and analysis of tough cases. 
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The interview technique was chosen as the knowledge elicitation approach 
because the SMEs were busy working their jobs and had limited time. Also, the small 
number of participants in the research (one person, later doubled to two people) ruled out 
other elicitation techniques such as focus groups. A survey, although feasible for portions 
of developing the model, was deemed too restrictive. Surveys tend to confine answers to 
a narrow scope and a wider lens was needed to gather the needed information. The 
interview process worked well when combined partially with other techniques like 
sorting and document analysis. 
A semi-structured interview was used for knowledge elicitation from the experts. 
The semi-structured interview was chosen in part due to Hoffman’s (2006) assertion that 
structured provides better results than unstructured. This technique allowed for more 
varied responses and avoids close-ended questions. In this particular case, the experts 
also happened to be the decision-makers, which was another reason the semi-structured 
approach was used. In many instances, decision-makers may be managers or supervisors 
who work exclusively in the role of overseeing others. They may not hold a high degree 
of knowledge on the particular subject and often rely on the expertise of others. This was 
not the case in this research, and it helped speed the process of creating the value 
hierarchy. 
The semi-structured approach worked because multiple, identical interviews did 
not need to be conducted over time as in a structured interview. Likewise, having no 
questions prepared in advance did not make sense as in an unstructured interview. The 
semi-structured interview was a good balance between the two. It allowed for a partially 
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formalized interaction between researcher and SME where a few constructed questions 
could generate further discussion on a subject. 
3.2.4 Expert Interactions 
Research into DEWs and the acquisition process was conducted before ever 
meeting with the expert. This was a vital piece of the pre-interview process to obtain 
credibility as a researcher and provide a base from which to formulate questions and 
guide the discussion. Five scheduled interviews were conducted over the course of the 
research, which lasted approximately seven months total. Each meeting was scheduled 
for one hour and opened with an explanation of the reason for the interview. Care was 
taken during each interview to distinguish between facts, opinions, and assumptions. In 
working through a semi-structured interview process, four to six questions were prepared 
beforehand with additional questions asked based on the answers. This technique led to 
open discussions and allowed for the free flow of information and knowledge. 
The first meeting happened early on and was meant as a “meet and greet” 
between researcher and expert. It served as a starting point for reconciling scholarly 
research and expert knowledge. Subsequent interviews progressed through the VFT steps. 
Interviews four and five saw the inclusion of a second expert. The combined knowledge 
and inputs of both SMEs enhanced the information being provided. Although the lack of 
a larger group of stakeholders could be thought of as detrimental to the process, it 
actually provided an opportunity to quickly come to decisions regarding the creation of 
the hierarchy. Lack of access to the decision-maker was not a problem throughout the 
hierarchy construction. 
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It should be noted that in the context of this research that the experts and decision-
makers were one and the same. Applied to an actual DEW acquisition program, the 
experts have authority to make limited decisions about HSI in the program. Other 
stakeholders and decision-makers make important decisions throughout over which the 
experts have little control. The experts are essentially the advocates for HSI within the 
program and could use the model to support their suggestions. 
3.3 VFT Process 
3.3.1 Step 1: Problem Identification 
The VFT steps shown in Figure 8 were used, starting with step 1. An incorrectly 
framed problem leads to the wrong problem being solved. This failure will inevitably 
lead to a poor decision because the decision will not be based on relevant analysis. 
Framing the decision specifies three key aspects of the decision: purpose, perspective, 
and scope (Parnell et al., 2013). 
Purpose: Arguably the most important part of the problem is defining the purpose. 
Sometimes the purpose is obvious and other times there might be a less obvious 
definition. The question that needs to be answered in the “why.” In this research the 
“why” was to measure the HSI in a DEW acquisition program. 
Perspective: Questions such as “is this going to save money” or “how can we 
increase the effectiveness” are examples of different views of the same problem. Coming 
at the problem from different angles can be beneficial, but framing helps identify the key 
issues and who should be making decisions. 
Scope: The scope of the decision sets the boundary from which the problem will 
be assembled. Areas outside the scope will not be examined and are deemed irrelevant to 
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the problem at hand. This research focused specifically on the HSI in DEWs as opposed 
to all weapon systems or other acquisition programs. 
The first two meetings with the decision-maker confirmed the need for an 
objective, defensible means to conduct HSI on a DEW acquisition program. The 
HSI/DEW expert had many years of experience and knowledge and the current situation 
had no standardized process for measuring the application of HSI. Too often, the 
supervisor would let the expert know when enough was enough. Importantly, the process 
was not necessarily repeatable from one DEW acquisition program to the next. 
To better meet the needs of the acquisition program and thus support the DEW 
system being developed, the many domains of HSI must be applied early and 
deliberately. The alternatives can then be analyzed to see how HSI was applied to the 
acquisition program. The Air Force states that the “goal of HSI is to maximize total 
system performance, understanding that the human element is an integral part of systems, 
while minimizing total ownership costs” (Carr & Greene, 2009a). Thus, the strategic 
values remain constant across the board of acquisition programs. This gives a clear 
indication of how HSI should be viewed during the acquisition process. 
3.3.2 Step 2: Identify & Structure Objectives 
The objectives definition phase went through several iterations after being 
discussed during the first few interviews. At first, a strawman hierarchy was developed 
through gold standard documents. After the first interactions and discussion, the 
hierarchy was updated with the new platinum standard information. The decision-makers 
agreed that the objective was to have a measurable way to fulfil their mandate of 
including HSI in the acquisition process while also satisfying their own internal objective 
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to “ensure weapons systems are designed, developed, or adapted with human capabilities 
and limitations in mind” (Department of the Air Force, 2018). The goal was to determine 
what was valued to achieve the fundamental objective and subsequently organize the 
values from general to more specific, in hierarchal format. Keywords, concepts, ideas, 
and values were recorded throughout each interview, sorted, and then grouped into 
logical bunches. This led to the basis for the model’s first hierarchy. 
The initial proposal had “Improve System Performance” as the fundamental 
objective and the nine HSI domains as the Tier 1 objectives. Further discussion revealed 
the initial fundamental objective was off the mark and missed addressing the identified 
problem. Although “Improve System Performance” is a part of the objective, it is not the 
primary objective. It was changed to “Integrate Human with DEW System” to capture the 
essence of what VFT would do for this problem. This top-down method first identified 
what is most important to the decision-maker and allowed the further breakdown of 
important objectives. The nine HSI domains originally used as tier 1 objectives were 
modified to their oft used combinations of Human Factors, MPT, ESOH, and Abilities 
(comprised of Survivability and Habitability). The second tier is comprised of more 
specific definitions of the nine HSI domains (first tier objectives). The third tier shows 
the most important and relevant values from the second tier. Finally, the measures make 
up the last tier and show the degree of attainment for the values in the previous tier. The 
value hierarchy shell is shown in Figure 9 and depicts the three distinct tiers (the final 
measures tier is not pictured). There are four tier 1 objectives, 11 tier 2, and 22 tier 3. 
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Figure 9. Value Hierarchy 
 
The first-tier objectives represent the same nine definitions previously covered in 
Chapter II. The relationship between the nine HSI domains and the fundamental objective 
represents a clear, logical way to view HSI in a given DEW program that results in a 
mutually exclusive, collectively exhaustive value hierarchy. There are some inherent 
overlaps with the nine domains as they are originally structured. For example, 
survivability and habitability can be argued to be sub-domains of human factors. The 
challenges with some similarities and potential for cross-contamination between 
objectives were overcome with second and third tier objectives that clearly defined how 
they fit into the hierarchy. This still allowed for trade-offs to be made between objectives 
while staying mutually exclusive. The first tier is shown in Figure 10 with the 
fundamental objective on top. Each of the four branches are ordered by how the HSI 
domains are normally addressed, but the order itself has no bearing on the problem. Each 
branch is broken down further in Chapter IV. Definitions of the four tier 1 objectives are 
shown in Table 3. 
 
Figure 10. Tier 1 
Integrate Human 
with DEW 
System
Human Factors MPT ESOH Abilities
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 Table 3. Abbreviated Definitions for Tier 1 (Drillings, Knapp, & Shattuck, 2015) 
Human 
Factors 
The integration of human characteristics into system definition, 
design, development, and evaluation to provide for effective human–
machine performance under operational conditions. 
MPT 
Manpower: The number of people needed to operate, maintain, train, 
and support a system; includes military, civilians, and contractors. 
Personnel: The performance-related characteristics of people needed 
to operate, maintain, and support the system. This includes the 
cognitive and physical capabilities required to train for, operate, 
maintain, and sustain materiel and information systems. 
Training: The process of designing and delivering a managed set of 
experiences so that people have the knowledge, skills, and attitudes 
that will enhance user capabilities, maintain skill proficiencies, and 
decrease individual and collective training costs. 
ESOH 
Environment: Those system design characteristics that serve to 
minimize the impact of the system on the water, air, and land and the 
interrelationship that exists among water, air, land, and all living 
things. Prevalent issues include the prevention of pollution of the 
environment by reducing the use of hazardous materials and the 
release of pollutants into the environment. 
Safety: The design features and operating characteristics of a system 
that serve to minimize the risk of illness, disability, or death to users, 
operators, and maintainers. 
Occupational Health: Design features and operating characteristics 
of a system that create significant risks of bodily injury or death. 
Prominent sources of health hazards include acoustics energy, 
chemical substances, biological substances, temperature extremes, 
radiation energy, oxygen deficiency, shock (not electrical), trauma, 
and vibration 
Abilities 
Survivability: Ability of personnel to exist and function during and 
following exposure to hostile situations or environments; includes 
combat weapons-induced injuries, enemy or friendly casualties, 
hazards inherent to personnel during threat or combat conditions, and 
inherent hazards of military equipment to include egress when system 
is damaged or destroyed. 
Habitability: Those living and working conditions that are necessary 
to sustain the morale, safety, health, and comfort of the user 
population. These conditions directly contribute to personnel 
effectiveness and mission accomplishment, and they often are related 
to recruitment and retention problems. 
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3.3.3 Step 3: Measure the Achievement of Objectives 
HSI practices can be measured in numerous ways. Cognitive workload, for 
example, has entire papers devoted to different methods of measurement. The practice 
used in this model to obtain measurements focused on obtainability and sensibility. A 
measure is of no use if the data cannot be obtained. Likewise, measurements that do not 
encapsulate the correct attribute are of no use. Measures were obtained through 
interviews with the decision-makers to ensure subject matter expertise was engrained into 
the model. Chapter IV shows measures for the lowest tier objectives. This research did 
not reach an in-depth conclusion regarding measures and instead provides proposals of 
what could be used Chapter IV. 
3.3.4 Step 4: Single Attribute Value Function 
Single attribute value functions were not fully developed for this research. Like 
step 3, only the method is explained. An example of a possible value function is 
mentioned in Chapter 4.1.5. 
Single attribute value functions (SAVFs) are used to standardize the measures 
across the hierarchy. Exponential, linear (including piecewise linear), categorical/discrete 
functions are the most common methods used (Kirkwood, 1996). The piecewise linear 
function contains line segments of varying slopes. A generic example of categorical data 
would be yes/no or low/medium/high options. With categorical data, each category (or 
choice) is assigned a number representing the capability. The lowest acceptable threshold 
was given a value of 0 while the best was given a score of 1. In the yes/no example, no 
would have a score of 0 while yes would score 1. In a low/medium/high example, the 
medium could possibly have a score of 0.5 or anywhere else between 0 and 1 based on 
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the decision-maker’s preference. Exponential functions of increasing preference signify 
that small inputs results in small outputs while large inputs result in large outputs. Larger 
numbers are preferred in these cases because they add more value. The value function is 
shown in Equation (1). The opposite is true for exponential functions of decreasing 
preference shown in Equation (2). 
 
𝑣(𝑥) =
{
 
 
 
 1 − exp⁡[−(𝑥 − 𝐿𝑜𝑤)/𝜌]
1 − exp⁡[−(𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ − 𝐿𝑜𝑤)/𝜌]
, 𝜌 ≠ 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑦
𝑥 − 𝐿𝑜𝑤
𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ − 𝐿𝑜𝑤
,⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 
 
𝑣(𝑥) =
{
 
 
 
 1 − exp⁡[−(𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ − 𝑥)/𝜌]
1 − exp⁡[−(𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ − 𝐿𝑜𝑤)/𝜌]
, 𝜌 ≠ 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑦
𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ − 𝑥
𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ − 𝐿𝑜𝑤
,⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 
 
3.3.5 Step 5: Multi Attribute Value Function (Weights) 
Appropriately applying weights to each attribute is a major part of the VFT 
process. The weights signify the importance of each attribute and account for differing 
scores for attributes with the same values. However, importance does not convey 
everything about weights. Keeney (1992) says, “if the value trade-offs are done properly 
and address the question of how much of one specific attribute is worth how much of 
another specific attribute, the insights from the analysis are greatly increased and the 
likelihood of misuse of those judgments is greatly decreased.” Local weights are those 
within the same branch and tier, that when summed equal 1. Figure 11 shows an example 
(2) 
(1) 
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of local weights. Attribute 1’s weight of 0.75 and Attribute’s 2 weight of 0.25 summed 
together equal 1. Likewise, Sub 1A’s 0.20 and Sub 1B’s 0.80 equal 1. 
 
 
Figure 11. Local Weights 
 
Global weights are similar except they sum to 1 across each row as shown by the 
numbers enclosed in parenthesis in Figure 12. Global weights can be viewed as each 
attribute’s max contribution to the overall score. Global weights can be determined either 
hierarchical or non-hierarchical. The hierarchical approach views each objective as it 
appears in the hierarchy and can be completed either top-down or bottom-up. The non-
hierarchical approach views only the lowest tier objectives. Once weights are determined, 
the upper-tier weights are calculated. 
Objective
Attribute 1
0.75
Sub 1A
0.20
Sub 1B
0.80
Attribute 2
0.25
Sub 2A
0.65
Sub 2B
0.35
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Figure 12. Global Weights 
 
The decision-makers used a direct weighting method (100-ball) to determine all 
weights. This method entails the decision-maker ranking each attribute on a scale of 1 to 
100. As explained in the preceding paragraphs, local weights across tiers and within 
branches will sum to 1, or 100 in the context of this method. Likewise, global weights 
will also sum to 100 across rows. The decision-maker pictured having 100 balls to 
allocate to attributes. After distributing the balls to each attribute, the decision-maker 
reviewed his allocations with the understanding that an attribute assigned a weight of 50 
indicated it was twice as important as one assigned a 25.  
A baseline estimation was provided to them based on previous discussions and 
they both made adjustments as needed. Using the top-down approach, they started with 
tier 1 and worked their way down to the lowest tier. At the conclusion of that session, the 
weights were verified to represent the importance of each attribute. Final weights will be 
discussed in Chapter IV. 
The 100-ball method was used because of incomplete measures and value 
functions. This method is a type of importance weight, that is, weights are assigned to 
Objective
Attribute 1
0.75 (0.75)
Sub 1A
0.20 (0.15)
Sub 1B
0.80 (0.60)
Attribute 2
0.25 (0.25)
Sub 2A
0.65 (0.16)
Sub 2B
0.35 (0.09)
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measures independent of the variation of the measure range. A more widely accepted 
method for determining weights is known as swing-weighting. In this method, both 
importance and variation of the scales of value measures are taken into account (Keeney, 
1992). For example, if we reduce the range of one of the measure scales while holding all 
other measure ranges constant, the measure’s relative weight decreases while all other 
weights increase. A swing-weight matrix is proposed by Parnell (2009) as a tool for 
decision-makers to assess swing weights. 
3.3.6 Step 6: Alternative Generation 
The timing can greatly affect the alternative generation process, given the nature 
of the acquisition process and when the HSI practitioners are first called upon for input. 
Pre Milestone A input would be different than later in the process. Sometimes there may 
be pre-existing alternatives in which case plugging in the numbers provides an easy 
comparison. The model can also be used to determine which trade-offs give the most 
benefit. The realization of trade-offs is one of the cornerstones of a VFT model. Taking 
away functionality in one area may lead to improved functionality elsewhere, resulting in 
a better overall system. 
3.3.7 Step 7: Alternative Scoring 
Scoring is completed by inputting the appropriate values into the model. A best 
practice is to have the decision-maker, or whoever is completing the scoring portion, to 
not review the weights or value functions prior to categorizing or assigning the 
appropriate value. This prevents the person from changing the value based on how they 
think the score may change due to its weight or particulars of it 
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3.3.8 Step 8: Deterministic Analysis 
Deterministic analysis examines the results of the model. Different ways of 
visualizing the alternatives are used to gain insights into the results. Two popular 
examples are the value breakout and cost vs value charts. The value breakout chart 
displays each alternative in a bar chart where it is easy to see how much each attribute 
contributes to the total score. The cost vs value chart depicts each alternative in relation 
to its cost (x-axis) and value (y-axis). Both charts, and others, can help uncover 
information within the model that may not be apparent at first glance. 
3.3.9 Step 9: Sensitivity Analysis 
Sensitivity analysis examines whether different assumptions lead to different 
scores and consequently, a reordering of the ranked alternatives. The most common 
aspect to change is the weights. For example, if a weight equaled 50% of the overall 
model, reducing it to 25% could have an impact on the alternatives’ ranks.  
3.4 Summary and Preview 
This chapter discussed the methods and procedures used to build the value 
hierarchy. The primary methods used were a series of in-depth interviews with the 
decision-makers, who were also subject matter experts in the applicable disciplines. The 
foundational input from both the experts and the Air Force’s HSI Handbook resulted in a 
credible and defendable value hierarchy. Chapter IV will cover the nuances of each 
branch including objective definitions and associated measures.  
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IV. Results 
 
The conclusion of interviews with the decision-makers resulted in a value 
hierarchy for use on DEW acquisition programs. Each branch of the hierarchy will be 
decomposed by objective. The objectives will be defined and proposed measures 
outlined. Finally, proposed weights are discussed. As explained more in Chapter V, the 
hierarchy needs some additional refinement before it could be used effectively. Figure 13 
shows the first tier of the hierarchy. 
 
 
Figure 13. Tier 1 (repeated) 
 
4.1 Decomposition of Branches 
Each branch (Human Factors, MPT, ESOH, and Abilities) will be explained with 
a visual representation, objective definitions to the lowest tier, and summary of measures. 
A branch-by-branch review was chosen over a step-by-step summary to offer a holistic 
view of each branch. The weighting portion is covered separately in the chapter to build a 
complete picture of the hierarchy. 
 
 
Integrate 
Human with 
DEW System
Human Factors MPT ESOH Abilities
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4.1.1 Human Factors Branch 
The human factors branch is an important part of HSI and is often mistaken as 
being the only HSI domain. This is probably because even without knowing it, people 
associate “human systems integration” with the directly human aspects found in human 
factors. The human factors branch, shown in Figure 14 and defined in Table 4, consists of 
three tier-2 objectives, each with two tier-3 objectives for a total of six lowest level 
objectives. With human factors as the overarching principle, a summary of the measures 
is shown in Table 5 and defined in Table 6. 
 
 
Figure 14. Human Factors Branch 
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Table 4. Definitions of Human Factors Branch 
Human Factors 
Suitable integration of human 
characteristics into system. 
 Cognitive 
Psychological processes of decision 
making and problem solving. 
 
Workload Level of mental effort put forth. 
Decision Support System 
Whether a decision support system (DSS) 
can assist. 
 Physical 
Relation of human interactions with the 
world. 
 
Interface 
Whether the point of interaction between 
human and system  
Controls Appropriate placement of touchpoints. 
 Organizational 
Connections between user, encompassing 
system, and other crew. 
 
User Experience 
Satisfaction of user while operating 
system. 
Team Dynamic 
Whether relationship between crew 
members affects functionality.  
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Table 5. Summary of Measures for Human Factors Branch 
 
Lowest-Tier 
Hierarchy 
Value 
Associated 
Measure 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
C
o
g
n
it
iv
e Workload 
Speed of Kill 
Chain 
Slower Faster 
Decision 
Support 
System 
Error Rate 5% 0% 
P
h
y
si
ca
l Interface Ease of Use Various 
Controls Reachability Hard Easy 
O
rg
an
iz
at
io
n
al
 
User 
Experience 
Satisfaction 
Level 
Low High 
Team Dynamic 
Task 
Dependencies 
100% 0% 
 
Table 6. Definitions of Human Factors Measures 
Measure Definition 
Speed of Kill Chain (workload) 
The speed at which the operator can 
complete the kill chain, i.e. faster or 
slower than opposing force. 
Error Rate 
How often the DSS provides inaccurate 
information. 
Ease of Use 
The ease at which an operator can interact 
with the system. 
Reachability 
How difficult it is for the operator to reach 
controls.  
Satisfaction Level 
Whether an operator experiences 
fulfillment from operating the system. 
Task Dependencies 
The operator’s reliance on other crew 
members to operate effectively. 
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4.1.2 MPT Branch 
The MPT branch, shown in Figure 15 and defined in Table 7, consists of three 
tier-2 objectives and a total of nine lowest level objectives. The reader may notice the 
“personnel” in MPT is represented in the hierarchy as Knowledge, Skills, and Attributes 
(KSAs). This distinction is due to KSAs being the primary personnel factor to consider 
for this research. The four lowest-level objectives for both Manpower and KSAs are 
identical. This is because the type of manpower to consider are the same people who need 
to possess the requisite KSAs. With MPT as the overarching principle, a summary of the 
measures is shown in Table 8 and defined in Table 9. 
 
 
Figure 15. MPT Branch 
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Table 7. Definitions of MPT Branch 
MPT  
 Manpower 
The number of people needed to employ 
system. 
 
Operators People who operate the system. 
Maintainers People who maintain the system. 
Support Personnel People who support the system. 
Trainers 
People who provide training for the 
operation, maintenance, and support of the 
system. 
 KSAs 
Knowledge, skills, and abilities pertinent 
to employment of the system. 
 
Operators People who operate the system. 
Maintainers People who maintain the system. 
Support Personnel People who support the system. 
Trainers 
People who provide training for the 
operation, maintenance, and support of the 
system. 
 Training 
The experiences and tools used to teach 
system users what they need to know. 
 System 
Classes, instructions, manuals, aids, and 
anything else that is used to provide 
training. 
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Table 8. Summary of Measures for MPT Branch 
 
Lowest-Tier 
Hierarchy Value 
Associated 
Measure 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
M
an
p
o
w
er
 
Operators 
Personnel 
Required 
Relative to 
Legacy System 
More Less 
Maintainers 
Support 
Trainers 
K
S
A
s 
Operators 
ASVAB Score High Low 
Maintainers 
Support 
Trainers 
T
ra
in
in
g
 
System 
Course Length 
(wks) 
12 1 
 
Table 9. Definitions of MPT Measures 
Measure Definition 
Personnel Required Relative to Legacy 
System 
The number of personnel required 
compared to the legacy system. This 
includes operators, maintainers, support 
personnel, and trainers. 
ASVAB Score 
The Armed Services Vocational Aptitude 
Battery score. 
Length (wks) 
The length of formal training for 
operators. 
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4.1.3 ESOH Branch 
The ESOH branch, shown in Figure 16 and defined in Table 10, consists of three 
tier 2 objectives and an equal number of lowest level objectives. They are, in essence, 
proxy attributes to the tier-2 objectives. As noted in the next section, the equal number of 
tier-2 and tier-3 objectives result in both tiers having the same weights. The reason for the 
further decomposition is to clarify what objective is actually being measured. It also 
makes more sense when paired with the remainder of the hierarchy so each branch has a 
similar number of tiers. With ESOH as the overarching principle, a summary of the 
measures is shown in Table 10 and defined in Table 11. 
 
 
Figure 16. ESOH Branch 
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Table 10. Definitions of ESOH Branch 
ESOH  
 Environment 
Characteristics that minimize the impact 
of the system on the world around it.  
 Application 
Whether methods of smart employment 
are known. 
 Safety 
Characteristics that minimize risk of 
injury. 
 Mishaps 
Any unplanned event that results in 
personal injury or property damage. 
 Occupational Health Risks from the system itself. 
 Exposure 
Whether effects can be controlled to 
minimize accidental exposure to persons 
other than targets. 
 
Table 11. Summary of Measures for ESOH Branch 
 
Lowest-Tier 
Hierarchy Value 
Associated 
Measure 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
E
n
v
ir
o
n
m
en
t 
Application 
Do operational 
plans include 
methods/reasons 
for 
employment? 
No Yes 
S
af
et
y
 
Mishaps 
Incident 
Rate by 
Class 
A >3% 
0% 
B >4% 
C >6% 
D >8% 
O
cc
u
p
at
io
n
al
 
H
ea
lt
h
 
Exposure 
Likelihood of 
Accidental 
Exposure 
10% 0% 
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Table 12. Definitions of ESOH Measures 
Measure Definition 
Do operational plans include 
methods/reasons for employment? 
Planning guidance taking into account 
DEWs. Do leaders and operators possess 
the know-how of when to employ the 
weapon? 
Incident Rate by Class 
The DoD categorizes into four classes: 
A - >$2M in damages 
B - >$500,000 in damages 
C - >$50,000 in damages 
D - >$20,000 in damages 
Likelihood of Accidental Exposure 
Chance of non-target being exposed to the 
weapon’s beam. 
 
4.1.4 Abilities Branch 
The Abilities branch, shown in Figure 17 and defined in Table 13, consists of two 
tier-2 objectives, each with two lowest level objectives, for a total of four lowest-level 
objectives. With Abilities as the overarching principle, a summary of the measures is 
shown in Table 12 and defined in Table 13. 
 
 
Figure 17. Abilities Branch 
Abilities
Survivability
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Table 13. Definitions of Abilities Branch 
Abilities  
 Survivability 
Ability to function in hostile situations or 
environments. 
 
Susceptibility Inability to avoid threats. 
Vulnerability Inability to withstand hits. 
 Habitability 
Living and working conditions to sustain 
users of the system. 
 
SWaP 
Reasonable size, weight, and power for 
system. 
Workspace Layout 
Characteristics of the workspace such as 
temperature and lighting conditions. 
 
Table 14. Summary of Measures for Abilities Branch 
 
Lowest-Tier 
Hierarchy Value 
Associated 
Measure 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
S
u
rv
iv
ab
il
it
y
 
Susceptibility 
Probability of 
DEW Hit 
100% 0% 
Vulnerability 
Probability of 
DEW Kill 
100% 0% 
H
ab
it
ab
il
it
y
 
SWaP 
Dimensions 
Varies by System Enclosing 
the DEW System 
Weight (lbs) 
Power Used 
(kW) 
Workspace Layout 
Lighting (fc) 30 50 
HVAC Worst Best 
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Table 15. Definitions of Abilities Measures 
Measure Definition 
Probability of DEW Hit 
How likely the DEW system is to take a 
hit. 
Probability of DEW Kill 
How likely the DEW system is to cease 
functioning after a hit. 
Dimensions 
Total size of the system in length, width, 
height. 
Weight (lbs) How much the system weighs. 
Power Used (kW) How much power the system uses. 
Lighting (fc) The amount of lighting in the workspace. 
HVAC 
The heating, ventilation, and air 
conditioning of the workspace. 
 
4.1.5 Example SAVFs 
Two example SAVFs are shown in Figures Figure 18 and Figure 19. Figure 18 
shows a possible SAVF for the length of training in weeks. If the length of training were 
one week, it would receive a score of 1, the highest possible score. A length of 12 weeks 
would result in a score of 0, the lowest possible value. The midvalue of four weeks would 
receive a score of 0.5. When determining SAVFs, the midvalue can change based on the 
decision-maker’s discretion. Whereas some may keep the midvalue exactly in the middle 
of the range, others could feel the midvalue was closer to the extremes, changing the 
value in the process. 
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Figure 18. Example Exponential SAVF 
 
 Figure 19 shows a possible SAVF for illuminance of the workspace as measured 
in foot candles (fc). An illuminance equal to 30 fc would score 0, the lowest possible 
value. An illuminance equal to 50 fc would score 1, the highest possible value. An 
illuminance equal to 40 fc would score 0.5, the mid-value. 
SAVF for Training Length 
Length (weeks) 
V
al
u
e 
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Figure 19. Example Linear SAVF 
 
4.2 Hierarchy Weights 
Weights across tiers will be displayed in the same manner as discussed in the 
previous chapter, with global weights enclosed in parenthesis. The tier-1 weights are 
shown in Figure 20 and Figure 21. The tier-1 weights have equal local and global 
weights. It was determined that the MPT branch was the most important and thus 
deserved a weight of 0.55, the highest of any objective. The relatively high importance 
stems from the fact that most costs over the life of a system come from the people 
involved with said system. Second most important was Human Factors at 0.20, followed 
by ESOH at 0.15 and Abilities at 0.10. The decision-makers were careful not to discount 
any particular objective and weighted them appropriately based on their observance of 
practiced procedures and sentiments. 
SAVF for Workspace Lighting 
V
al
u
e 
Lighting (foot candles) 
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Figure 20. Tier 1 Weights 
 
 A graph of the weight distribution is shown in Figure 21. As mentioned in the 
previous paragraph, MPT holds the highest weight and thus is the most important to the 
decision-maker. As visualized below, it is almost three times more important than the 
next highest attribute, Human Factors. To put how much more weight MPT has than the 
other attributes in perspective, it is about 3.5 times more than ESOH and 4.5 times more 
than Abilities. Likewise, the 0.20 weight for Human Factors is twice as big as Abilities’ 
0.10 weight. The remainder of the hierarchy is broken down in the following sections. 
 
Figure 21. Tier 1 Weights Chart 
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4.2.1 Human Factors Weights 
Human Factors was broken down into three tier-2 objectives, with each of those 
being broken into two tier-3 objectives (shown in Figure 22). Cognitive, Physical, and 
Organizational have local weights of 0.55, 0.35, and 0.10, respectively. The global 
weights are 0.11, 0.07, and 0.02. Global weights have meaning in the overall hierarchy 
discussion. Out of the entire 20% weight Human Factors has in the hierarchy, Cognitive 
is 11%, Physical 7%, and Organizational 2%. If each category was given the maximum 
score, it would equal 20% of the total score. 
 
 
Figure 22. Human Factors Weights 
 
Cognitive: The cognitive objective had the highest weight among the three tier-2 
objectives. This is due to the assertion that operating a DEW is mostly mental as opposed 
to a physical toll on the body. The tier-3 objectives of Workload and DSS were given 
equal local weights of 0.50, resulting in identical global weights of 0.055. The global 
weights indicate a top score in each category would result in 11% of the total score, at 
5.5% each. 
Human Factors
0.20
Cognitive
0.55 (0.11)
Workload
0.50 (0.055)
DSS
0.50 (0.055)
Physical
0.35 (0.07)
Interface
0.50 (0.035)
Controls
0.50 (0.035)
Organizational
0.10 (0.02)
User Experience
0.50 (0.01)
Team Dynamic
0.50 (0.01)
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Physical: The physical objective had the second highest weight of 0.35 and like 
cognitive, had two tier-3 objectives. The Interface and Controls were locally weighted 
evenly at 0.50, resulting in global weights of 0.035. The global weights indicate a top 
score in each category would result in 7% of the total score, at 3.5% each. 
Organizational: The organizational objective was deemed the least important with 
a weight of 0.10. Again, two tier-3 objectives of User Experience a Team Dynamic were 
used. The local weights were 0.50 and global 0.01. The global weights indicate a top 
score in each category would result in 2% of the total score, at 1% each. 
4.2.2 MPT Weights 
MPT was broken down into three tier-2 objectives and a total of nine tier-3 
objectives (shown in Figure 23). Manpower, KSAs, and Training have local weights of 
0.30, 0.50, and 0.20, respectively. The global weights are 0.165, 0.275, and 0.11. This 
branch has the highest weights of all the branches, signifying the importance of 
manpower, personnel, and training. KSAs are the most important objective in the 
hierarchy, accounting for 27.5% of the total score. Second most important is Manpower 
at 16.5% followed by Training at 11%. Cognitive, from the Human Factors branch, also 
comprises 11% of the total score. MPT and Human Factors combine to account for 75% 
of the total potential score. 
 
Figure 23. MPT Weights 
MPT
0.55
Manpower
0.30 (0.165)
Operators
0.60 (0.099)
Maintainers
0.15 (0.025)
Support
0.15 (0.025)
Trainers
0.10 (0.017)
KSAs
0.50 (0.275)
Operators
0.60 (0.165)
Maintainers
0.15 (0.041)
Support
0.15 (0.041)
Trainers
0.10 (0.028)
Training
0.20 (0.11)
System
1 (0.11)
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 Manpower: The manpower objective was deemed second most important of the 
MPT branch with a weight of 0.30. Four tier-3 objectives of Operators, Maintainers, 
Support, and Trainers were used. The Operators objective was deemed most important 
with a local weight of 0.60 and global weight of 0.099. Maintainers and Support share 
equal importance with local weights of 0.15 and global weights of 0.025. Least important 
was Trainers at 0.10 and 0.017. The global weights indicate a top score in each category 
would result in 16.5% of the total score, with 9.9% allocated to Operators, 2.5% each to 
Maintainers and Support, and 1.7% to Trainers. 
 KSAs: The KSAs objective was deemed most important of the MPT branch, 
which also made it the most important objective to the hierarchy. The four tier-3 
objectives are identical to those in the Manpower objective and share the same local 
weights of Operators – 0.60, Maintainers – 0.15, Support – 0.15, and Trainers – 0.10. 
However, due to the increased weight of the tier-2 KSAs objective, the global weights are 
larger at 0.165, 0.041, 0.041, and 0.028, respectively. The global weights indicate a top 
score in each category would result in 27.5% of the total score, with 16.5% allocated to 
Operators, 4.1% each to Maintainers and Support, and 2.8% to Trainers. 
 Training:  The Training objective was deemed the least important with a weight 
of 0.20. The one tier-3 objective of System has a local weight of 1 and global weight of 
0.11. The global weight indicates a top score in System would result in 11% of the total 
score. 
4.2.3 ESOH Weights 
ESOH was broken down into three tier-2 objectives, each with only one tier-3 
objective (shown in Figure 24). Environment, Safety, and Occupational Health have local 
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weights of 0.20, 0.60, and 0.20, respectively. The global weights are 0.03, 0.09, and 0.03. 
A large drop in importance can be seen in the weights for the three tier-2 objectives. 
Environment and Occupational Health account for 6% of the total score at 3% each while 
Safety is 9%. To add context, the KSAs of Trainers in the MPT branch account for 2.8% 
of the total score, which is almost the same as both Environment and Occupational 
Health individually. Each of the three tier 2 objectives only had one tier 3 objective, 
meaning global weights in both tiers were identical. To add context, the Manpower of 
Operators in the MPT branch equal 9.9%, about 1% more than the Mishaps weight. 
 
 
Figure 24. ESOH Weights 
  
4.2.4 Abilities Weights 
Abilities was broken down into two tier-2 objectives, each with two tier-3 
objectives (shown in Figure 25). Survivability and Habitability have local weights of 0.30 
and 0.70, respectively. The global weights are 0.03 and 0.07. They indicate a top score in 
ESOH
0.15
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0.20 (0.03)
Application
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each category would result in 10% of the total score, with 3% allocated to Survivability 
and 7% to Habitability. 
 
Figure 25. Abilities Weights 
 
 Both tier-2 attributes of Survivability and Habitability have two tier 3 attributes. 
Survivability is divided into Susceptibility at 0.50 local and Vulnerability at 0.50 local. 
Their global weights are both 0.015. Habitability is divided into SWaP at 0.50 local and 
Workspace Layout at 0.50 local. Both global weights are 0.035. The global weights of 
Susceptibility and Vulnerability are 1.5%, the lowest in the entire hierarchy. This is not to 
say these attributes are unimportant. Rather, it says they are the least important when 
compared to all other attributes. 
4.3 Steps 6-9: Alternative Generation, Scoring, and Analysis 
These steps were not applicable to the problem because there were no ongoing, 
accessible DEW acquisition projects from which to garner data. This does not invalidate 
Abilities
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the method because VFT is already proven as a method to solve these types of problems, 
i.e. complex, significant consequences, and multiple objectives. 
4.4 Step 10: Communicating Results 
Results can be communicated in various ways and tailored to specific audiences 
or decision-makers. Recommendations can be made and it is important to note that the 
highest scoring alternative may not always be the best choice given certain assumptions 
of other influencers to the problem. 
4.5 Usefulness of Hierarchy 
A decision-maker should be able to use this hierarchy as a starting point for 
recognizing what is important when applying HSI principles to a DEW acquisition 
program. The hierarchy itself will not produce any output. Three possible options for 
inputting data are The Perduco Group’s web-based VFT Tool, the Microsoft Excel 
version developed by Dr. Weir at AFIT, or the “DecisionAnalysis” package developed by 
Deehr (2018) located on the Comprehensive R Archive Network (CRAN) website, 
written in the programming language R. All packages will perform the same calculations 
and output identical values. Once the values are input and scores are calculated, 
alternatives can be compared against each other. Then adjustments can be made to certain 
values to generate new alternatives that may not have previously been options. 
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V. Conclusion 
 
This chapter reiterates the complex nature of military acquisition and the need to 
incorporate human systems integration (HSI) early in the process. To effectively combat 
future threats to the accomplishment of the Air Force’s mission, game-changing 
technologies are needed. One such technology is a directed energy weapon (DEW). An 
issue with DEW acquisition is the lack of a formal measurement of HSI in the acquisition 
process. Since the incorporation of HSI can result in substantial cost savings and a better 
overall weapon system, a value-focused thinking (VFT) is proposed to measure the 
effectiveness of HSI. However, future work is needed to transform this model into a 
useful tool for HSI practitioners. 
5.1 Conclusion 
The military’s acquisition process is a long, complex process that becomes even 
more complex with efforts to procure weapons that will provide superiority on the 
battlefield for years to come. These types of weapons are often more expensive due to the 
technological advances over their predecessors. Directed energy weapons have proved 
costly to develop over time, are technologically advanced, and require a specific skillset 
and knowledge to be utilized properly. All factors combined, this research shows how 
knowledge can be obtained from a DEW and HSI expert and converted into a value 
hierarchy using VFT. The value hierarchy can then be used in subsequent DEW 
procurements to focus effort on specific HSI components. 
 83 
Through the use of multi-domain expert knowledge and a codified process, 
organizations such as the Air Force can use VFT and its value hierarchy multiple times 
with minimal additional time and work investment. The value hierarchy contains all 
objectives important to the organization (or at least the decision-maker) and attributes 
that allow the measurement of each objective. After inputting applicable values, VFT 
provides a score for each alternative. This allows decision-makers to compare alternatives 
not just by rank, but by degree of objective achievement. VFT’s strengths of 
repeatability, alternative generation, sensitivity analysis, and alternative scoring make it a 
good fit for evaluating HSI practices within a DEW acquisition program. 
The hierarchy shows the majority of time and effort should be spent on the 
Manpower, Personnel, and Training HSI domains, as evidenced by the 55% weighting of 
the MPT objective. One reason for the overwhelming importance of MPT is due to cost. 
Over the life-cycle of a DEW system, or any acquisition program, the majority of costs 
occur in the operations and support phase (Schwartz, 2014). In this phase, much of the 
cost inevitably pertains to manpower, personnel, and training. Therefore, correctly 
ascertaining the optimal mix of operators, maintainers, support personnel, and trainers for 
the new system will help accurately forecast lifecycle costs. Getting the number of 
personnel right is just one aspect. Correctly training and employing all personnel is 
another factor to consider and is not covered within the model. Training length is 
included in the model to account for the benefit of less training time. Likewise, requiring 
less personnel to run the new system can only be seen as beneficial. Selecting the right 
personnel is also important. Personnel with a higher ASVAB score would require less 
training time and be better suited initially to run the system. However, higher scoring 
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personnel would be harder to obtain due to their demand elsewhere. This in turn could 
lead to higher recruiting costs or a possible shortage of needed personnel. The HSI 
domains of manpower, personnel, and training are vitally important to acquisition 
programs and weapon systems. If nothing else, a user of this model should focus their 
efforts on these three HSI domains to influence the acquisition effort and development of 
the system. 
The next area of focus should be the HSI domain of Human Factors. As 
mentioned previously, many people only think of human factors when thinking of HSI. 
This is due in part to the very physical relation between the human and the machine, 
which is enveloped within the human factors domain. The real link between human and 
machine grabs peoples’ attention and causes them to forget about the other HSI domains. 
However, this model weights the Human Factors objective at 20%, a full 35% lower than 
the 55% of the MPT objective. Together, the top two weighted objectives account for 
75% of the model. The remaining 25% is still important, just not as central to DEW 
system characteristics. 
This research successfully answered the first investigative question of whether an 
expert’s knowledge of the HSI domains could be represented in a value hierarchy. 
Although this is only one possible solution, this model proves that the nine HSI domains 
can be represented in a value hierarchy. Other than simple pasting the titles of the nine 
domains into a hierarchal format, the beauty of a value hierarchy is the knowledge it 
contains. The weights are telling figures that demonstrate the relative importance of the 
nine domains as they relate to a DEW system. The attributes further reveal aspects of HSI 
that make a difference in DEW systems. 
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Knowledge was captured from an HSI expert and transferred via the creation of 
the value hierarchy. The hierarchy itself serves as a repository for the knowledge and 
indicates what a person should focus on when conducting HSI assessments of a DEW 
acquisition program. A fully produced model could improve a DEW acquisition program 
by providing insight into areas of concern. For example, if the model produced a score of 
20 out of 55 for the MPT objective, that tells the decision-maker the particular DEW 
acquisition program is not doing well in manpower, personnel, or training. Further 
investigation would reveal a more precise reason for the low score. This knowledge by 
itself could provide insight into ways to change or otherwise improve the DEW program. 
It could also be combined with other methods such as cost estimation to provide further 
insight. 
5.2 Future Work 
There are four primary ways to develop this model into a useful tool given more 
time, data, and organizational involvement. First, refining the measures of each attribute 
would allow the input of data when it becomes available. As they stand, the measures are 
proposed and do not have value functions to back them up. The decision was made to not 
use the sponsor’s time developing value measures that would not be used at this time. 
While still useful, the model needs to be fully flushed out and applied before it can be 
proven to be a viable method of assessing HSI within a DEW acquisition program. 
Second, fully developing and using the VFT model on a real dataset would put the 
model to use and allow the sponsoring organization to see if results were helpful. The 
absence of real-world data resulted in a premature stopping point in the development of 
the model. As a result, the model lacks the ability to produce some of the more insightful 
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aspects of VFT analysis, notably deterministic and sensitivity analysis. Once steps 3 & 4 
are fully completed, swing-weighting should be used to reassess weights. This would be a 
more complete approach to determining weights by accounting for both importance and 
variation in measures. 
Third, additional expert elicitation on HSI would bring more perspective and 
ideas to the table. At the beginning of the decision analysis process, ideas and 
brainstorming act as the foundation for building the hierarchy. More ideas at the start of 
the process could lead to a more comprehensive hierarchy by not omitting something that 
a single expert may have overlooked. At the very least, a discussion could take place 
involving multiple personalities to gain new perspectives. Care must be taken to ask 
experts questions from their field of expertise. 
Finally, additional VFT models could be developed to account for differences in 
the acquisition phases. Some measures may not be applicable in the early phases and 
could paint an inaccurate picture of the state of alternatives. It is also possible to evaluate 
alternatives based on estimations and projections and then refining the estimates into 
quantifiable data as it becomes available.  
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